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1. Food Crises in a Boundless Europe 
The world is experiencing an increasing number of situations that can be characterised by 
the term crisis. One definition of this term states that it is “a serious threat to the basic 
structures or the fundamental values and norms of a social system, which – under time 
pressure and highly uncertain circumstances – necessitates making critical decisions” 
(Boin 2004:167). At a time when people, goods and information travel across borders to 
a greater extent than ever before, crisis situations tend to do the same. Recent examples 
are the Tsunami disaster in South-Asia 25 December 2004 that affected countries far 
beyond the reach of its waves and the 2005 London Tube Bombings which demanded a 
cross-border police investigation. In each case, countries cooperated to solve the crisis 
faced. In the European Union (EU) institutional mechanisms in a broad range of policy 
areas have been established to facilitate cooperation between its Member States in crisis 
management. This is particularly the case for the food safety policy area (Boin et al. 
2006a; European Commission website3). However, crisis management can be argued to 
be one of the central tasks of national governments and EU Member States could 
therefore be expected to be reluctant towards integrative proposals (Rhinhard et al. 2006; 
Rosenthal et. al. 2001). Focusing on those who have been driving the integration of food 
safety crisis management forward, the following research question is put forward: 
Why is crisis management in the food safety area being integrated at               
European level when it is sensitive and vital for national governments? 
European Involvement 
Throughout the last two decades the EU has been increasingly involved in crisis 
management in the food safety area and has taken on both new planning and new 
response competences. However, the EU level involvement in crisis management in the 
food safety area started decades ago in 1979 when the Rapid Alert System for Food was 
put in place. The purpose of this system is to “(...) provide control authorities with an 
effective tool for exchange of information on measures taken to ensure food safety” 
(European Commission website2). Several major food crises have hit Europe since the 
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Rapid Alert System was established, with both the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
(BSE) crisis centred in the United Kingdom and the Dioxin Chicken Crisis in Belgium1 
managed by a mixture of national governments and the EU level (Grönvall 2001:170). 
In 2002, after half a decade of discussions, the EU reformed its approach to food safety 
and created new EU-level monitoring and response capacities with the overall mission to 
“assure a high level of food safety, animal health, animal welfare and plant health within 
the European Union (...)” (European Commission website3). This reform merged a 
number of crisis management measures and included plans for a crisis unit to serve as 
coordination centre, established the European Food Safety Agency (EFSA) as well as 
cross-border meeting points for national and EU representatives in charge of crisis 
management to frame potential crisis situations broadly (Boin et al. 2006a:40). As 
described in chapter two the regulation implemented in 2002 meant a step forward in the 
integration process in the food safety area by building up initial EU crisis response 
capacities and drawing up important guidelines for the future of EU crisis management 
capacities. 
National Importance 
The increased involvement of the EU in crisis management in the food safety area makes 
the division between the supranational and the national level a central feature to study. 
The balance between these two levels of government “(…) varies between different 
protection policy activities, in turn altering the extent to which the influence of „Europe‟ 
extends into national governance settings” (Rhinhard et al. 2006:523). Neither scholars, 
nor politicians nor bureaucrats have come up with a simple answer to what the „right‟ 
division of competences is within a multilevel governance system concerned with 
protecting citizens (Ibid.). 
The management of crisis situations can be argued to be one of the central tasks of 
national governments. In a sense this can be seen as an extensive version of the old adage 
                                              
1 The Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Crisis and the Dioxin Chicken Crisis will be further elaborated in Section 
2.2 bellow. 
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that governmental effectiveness derives from its legitimate pursuit of civil order 
(Rosenthal et. al. 2001:17). “Collective discomfort with possible threats and the violation 
of expectations about stability and order will raise questions about the legitimacy of 
government” (Ibid.). In other words, because of crisis situations‟ extreme sensitivity, 
good management is crucial for the popularity of governments among their voters, as it is 
they who hold the fundamental responsibility for keeping their citizens safe, and for an 
effective response capacity. In the food safety area the 1996 BSE Crisis can be used to 
exemplify this argument. The British government wanted to be in charge of the crisis 
response itself and strongly opposed any EU measures or involvement to limit the spread 
of the disease (Grönvall 2001:163; Lezaun and Groenleer 2006:439). It was seen as vital 
by the British government that they were able to manage the situation themselves. Not 
only because they saw good crisis management as crucial for their initial domestic 
support, but also because any strict restrictions on British beef exports would mean an 
enormous financial burden which the domestic political circles could not accept 
(Grönvall 2001:165). 
Contrary to what could be expected, we have seen and continue to see an integration of 
crisis management in the food safety area in the EU. If Member States are reluctant to 
delegate crisis management to the EU level, what is then driving this process forward? 
1.1 Approach 
Three hypotheses to answer the research question are put forward. The introductory 
argument states that integration will not happen on policy areas argued to be in the 
national interest to the Member States. Therefore, the Member States would be reluctant 
to integrate food safety crisis management at EU level. To control the accuracy of this 
argument the following hypothesis has been created: 
Hypothesis A: The integration process of crisis management in the food safety area in 
the EU has been driven forward by Member States. 
Both the European Parliament and the European Commission have been heavily involved 
in the food safety area. To investigate if these EU-level institutions have had an 
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independent effect on the integration of food safety crisis management, which may also 
be in opposition to the national interests of important Member States, a second 
hypothesis has been created: 
Hypothesis B: The integration process of crisis management in the food safety area in 
the EU has been driven forward by European level institutions. 
The EU food safety area has not been isolated in its development, and is part of a wider 
pattern of policy making beyond the nation state. A third hypothesis to control for the 
independent effect of ideas originating in the EU‟s institutional environment has 
therefore been created: 
Hypothesis C: The integration process of crisis management in the food safety area in 
the EU has been driven forward by ideas originating in the EU’s institutional 
environment. 
These hypotheses are based on assumptions drawn from theories on EU integration 
processes and the study of institutions: Intergovernmentalism; Historical Institutionalism; 
and an Environment-Based Perspective. The theories employed will not be discussed as 
mutually exclusive approaches. The aim is not to test the theories themselves, but rather 
to let the theories guide the study as I attempt to unravel the explanations for the 
integration process. Chapter three presents the complete theoretical framework employed 
and the empirical expectations drawn from each theory. 
To discuss the first hypothesis (Hypothesis A), I have chosen to apply an 
Intergovernmental Perspective. It is based on the assumption that the Member States are 
the ones to make the important decisions and set down the premises for the development 
of the EU (Cini 2003:94). Member States involve themselves in European integration 
without ceding sovereignty, which allows them to retain control of the policy 
development process (Ibid. 96). 
To discuss the second hypothesis (Hypothesis B), I have chosen to apply Historical 
Institutionalism. EU level institutions can influence the participating decision makers‟ 
interests, preferences and identities, which again influence the choice of political 
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measures, outcomes and structures (Egeberg 2004:200; Pollack 2005:362). By 
emphasising historical aspects, the choices made early in the history of any policy and the 
institutionalised commitments that grow out of them can be expected to determine 
subsequent decisions (Peters 2005:19-20). 
To discuss the third hypothesis (Hypothesis C), I have chosen to apply an Environment-
Based Perspective, which will allow me to put the EU development into context with 
other international institutions operating in the food safety area. It emphasises the 
vulnerability of organisations when it comes to influence from reform trends in the 
surroundings, and especially organisations they compare themselves to (Meyer and 
Rowan 1991:47). Two main reasons organisations might have to adopt ideas from its 
environment are discussed further; as a result of an imitation process or as a result of 
external pressure (DiMaggio and Powell 1991:67-96). This approach adds a second 
analytical level to this thesis. While the two first hypotheses focus on action and decision 
making, this perspective explains the integration of food crisis management by the spread 
of ideas. 
1.1.1 Typology and Delimitation 
An important term that has not yet been defined is „integration‟. According to the neo-
functionalistic theorist Ernst Haas integration is defined broadly as a process: 
“(...)whereby political actors in several, distinct national settings are persuaded 
to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new 
centre, whose institutions posses or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing 
national states” (in Diez and Wiener 2005:2). 
Furthermore, two main accounts of policy integration are important; integration within 
policy sectors and integration across policy sectors (Ugland and Veggeland 2006:2). 
They represent a complex relationship, and can be viewed separately or in relation to 
each other. The study objective in this thesis, the integration of crisis management within 
the food safety policy sector, can be placed under the first of these two accounts. 
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The dependent variable for this thesis is the food safety crisis management framework, 
which can vary by being organised on the national level and the EU level to different 
degrees. Indicators for the EU integration of crisis management in the food safety area 
need to be identified. Isolating what I believe to represent the most important integrative 
step, attention will be directed to the „Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food 
law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down the procedures in 
matters of food safety‟,2 referred to as “the 2002 Regulation”. This regulation reorganised 
the European organisation of food safety crisis management and established guidelines 
for the future developments still highly affective today. Selznick (1985:363-364 in 
Hellebø 2004:8) defines the term „regulation‟ as “(…) sustained and focused control 
exercised by a public agency over activities that are socially valued”, bringing the 
regulating institution into focus. The 2002 Regulation will be further elaborated on in 
chapter two. It should be emphasised that even though the 2002 Regulation represents the 
main integrative step, this is a process that has happened gradually as will be shown in 
chapter two and elaborated on throughout the analysis. 
As crisis management involves a broad spectrum of policy measures, it is necessary to be 
clear on what aspects will be in focus. To further narrow down the research focus the 
main attention will be directed towards the planning and response phases of crisis 
management as they are outlined in chapter two. This is done because the argument of 
the state being the main actor responsible in crisis situations can best be said to fit these 
two highly executive phases of crisis management. Though, because of the complexity of 
this reform process, involving all phases of crisis management and all aspects of food 
safety, they can not be discussed isolated and the analysis will therefore utilise a broader 
approach to the policy integration process studied. 
Since this is a process tracking analysis, I will need a clear and limited research time 
frame. The 1996 BSE Crisis and the initial response it evoked will be used as an 
                                              
2 The 2002 Regulation established the general principals and outlined the major new arrangements established for the food 
safety area. To make these arrangements more concrete the Corrigendum to Commission Decision concerning the adoption 
of a general plan for food /feed crisis management was later implemented (European Commission 2004). Because it was 
heavily based on and framed by the 2002 Regulation it will be viewed as part of the same reform. 
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analytical starting point and the 2002 Regulation as the end point. The focus will 
therefore be on what is currently known as the „EU 15‟, meaning the EU structure when 
it consisted of fifteen Member States. 
The EU system holds a multitude of institutions with more or less supranational aspects. 
After close investigation of the involved actors in the process in focus I have chosen to 
direct attention towards the European Commission and the European Parliament when 
discussing the role of the EU institutions. The European Court of Justice can be argued to 
be a minor actor in this area and is therefore not being referred to in the analysis. Also, 
because of the lack of data on internal Council debates, only passing references will be 
made to it in the analysis. However, when the Council is part of the discussion it will be 
understood as representing the interests of the Member States, giving it an 
intergovernmental character, despite the fact that its food safety decisions as part of the 
Community Pillar were made by qualified majority voting3 (Lewis 2003:150). 
1.2 Methodology 
The purpose of this study is to explore the reasons why there has been an EU integration 
of food safety crisis management. The thesis‟ research question and the empirical 
material available make it more expedient to use a qualitative explanatory research 
method (Yin 2003:3-5). In the following section I will present the chosen methodological 
framework by elaborating on case studies and data selection. I will also reflect on aspects 
of reliability and validity. 
1.2.1 Case Study as Research Method 
According to Andersen (2003:6), case study research is the dominant empirical research 
strategy for the study of the EU. If appropriately designed the case study method would 
be the most appropriate to address the research question as it allows an in-depth study of 
                                              
3 Qualified majority voting is a system of voting in the Council, “which attributes a number of votes to each member state. 
A majority of these votes is needed for legislation to be agreed in the Council, implying that some states will be outvoted, 
but will have to apply the legislation all the same” (Cini 2003:422). 
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the case (Yin 2003). A case study can be defined as an “empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 2003:13). 
The formulation of an explanatory framework is based on the theoretical perspectives and 
the hypotheses derived from them (Andersen 1997). 
I have chosen to treat the timeframe from the 1996 BSE Crisis until the 2002 Regulation 
as a single case. It could have been broken down into several case studies by treating 
each indicator as a separate case, and as such the study could have been comparative. 
However, as I view this as one process, I have chosen to conduct a single case study. The 
study will not present data on the individual level and consequently will not provide any 
information about the informal processes within the institutions in focus. As this study 
aims at increasing the knowledge about what has been framing these processes, it can be 
used as the basis for further, more in-depth analysis. 
The main objective of this thesis is case driven, throwing new light on the empirical issue 
at hand. The explanatory factors will be dependent on the assumptions of the selected 
theories, biasing the data. As Andersen (2003:10) explains: “The ambition is to apply 
theory, develop empirical implications and construct explanations”. It is important to 
clarify that this study does not aim at a full explanation of food safety crisis management 
integration. Instead, it lets the theoretical framework guide the use of data when 
presenting explanations to the research question. A common problem with case studies is 
the small number of units that are being analysed, and that the researcher therefore runs 
the risk of not being able to generalise from one specific study to the general situation. 
However, rather than generalising case studies to the populations or universes, case 
studies can be extended to theoretical propositions (Ibid.10). More quantitative oriented 
methods might be better for generalisation purposes, but because of the nature of my 
research approach I view the chosen strategy as more suitable. As the main objective is to 
understand the case itself by letting the theoretical framework guide the analyses of the 
empirical findings, I wish to broaden our understanding of food safety crisis management 
integration and the forces steering the process in general. 
 17 
1.2.2 Data Collection 
By choosing a case study approach I can highlight my research question with data from a 
number of different sources (Yin 2003:83). The three theories outlined briefly above will 
be used in chapter three to generate empirical expectations, creating the need for 
different sources of data. It is the theories that will guide the use of data and help create 
an explanatory framework for answering the research question. 
Documents and archival records will be used as the main source of evidence. The 2002 
Regulation together with other documents on food safety within the research time frame 
is made available by the EU on the Europa web portal and in the Official Journal of the 
European Union. Similarly, the World Trade Organisation and the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission have made their documents available on their web portals. Documents and 
archival records as sources of evidence hold several strengths: First, by being stable and 
exact, they can be viewed repeatedly and contain exact names, references and results of 
an event. Second, they are not created as a result of the study itself and make it possible 
to give the thesis a broad coverage in time and events taken into consideration (Ibid. 86). 
However, a common problem faced by researchers using documents as a source of 
evidence is that they may be hard to access. For this study this problem might be faced 
especially when reconstructing the early stages of the research time frame which started 
before internet publishing became the norm for governmental institutions and news 
agencies. In addition documents and archival records show the „official‟ story, making 
additional sources necessary. Newspapers and Community newsletters will be used to 
supplement the picture created by the official documents. Several news agencies and 
institutions covered the food safety area closely in the 1990s, like for example the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the University of Reading‟s EU Food Law News. 
Although legal documents are the main sources of information in this study, this is not a 
legal study. Focus will not be on the documents‟ legal status, but on what they can tell us 
about who has been steering the integration process in focus. They will not shed light on 
the more informal procedures that might have evolved but were never fully formalised. 
However, this is out of the scope for this thesis and for such an understanding of these 
processes it falls short. 
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In addition to official documents and newspaper articles, secondary literature will form a 
basic component when recreating the policy process in focus. As the BSE Crisis turned 
out to be one of the more significant political crises in the history of the EU, a broad 
range of studies have been done to analyse it and its aftermath. By reviewing these I can 
draw on earlier studies in my effort to shed light on my research question. This is 
especially the case for the initial aftermath of the BSE Crisis where access to official 
documents is more limited. Research conducted on the different regulations and policy 
papers will also be helpful when selecting the right documents for further analysis. 
Conducting interviews is a common way to collect data for case studies, providing the 
researcher with information on the individual level as well as clarification on informal 
processes (Yin 2003:89; Bonarjee 2007). However, for this thesis I have chosen not to 
undertake interviews. Some of the events being analysed took place more than a decade 
ago, raising questions about the reliability of interviews owing to recall issues. Also, as 
the research time frame spans over six years, reliable data would entail a large number of 
interviews on several government levels and in multiple organisations. An additional 
argument for not conducting interviews is the limited resources made available. 
Logistical coordination and expenses associated with travel limited this research options. 
1.2.3 Validity and Reliability 
To decide on the quality of case studies, two concepts are important: reliability and 
validity. Reliability measures the accuracy of which the operations of this study can be 
repeated with the same results (Yin 2003:34). Validity measures the collected data‟s 
relevance to answer the research question (Hellevik 2002:473). 
The main source of data to shed light on this integration process is official EU 
documents. Official documents can be expected to hold a high degree of reliability when 
used as data (Yin 2003:87). A common problem which researchers face when using both 
secondary literature and documents as resources is that they can selectively reflect the 
bias of the author. However, official documents can be taken as less biased than other 
sources, as random errors can be expected to be corrected over time. When employing 
internet sources it is especially important to be critical, as it often is unclear who the 
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author is and who it is written for (Engle 1996). I will argue that the internet sources 
applied here are reliable websites, as they are both reputable news agencies and 
descriptive outlines created by the institutions in focus. By employing data from a range 
of different sources, like newspapers and secondary literature, the chances of using 
biased data are further reduced. A large amount of the data employed is available on the 
internet, as presented on the closing pages of this thesis in the Bibliography, making them 
easily available for others wishing to repeat the analysis. I would therefore argue that the 
analysis is sufficiently robust. 
A solid theoretical framework and multiple data sources strengthen the validity of the 
study‟s data (Andersen 1997; Yin 2003). When it comes to construct validity, 
establishing accurate operational measures for the concepts being studied, I argue that the 
chosen data sources are suitable for shedding light on the integration of crisis 
management in the food safety area (Yin 2003:34). By providing multiple sources of 
evidence of the same phenomenon the potential problems of construct validity, such as 
biased data, can be addressed (Ibid. 99). The documents, secondary literature and 
newspaper articles used to build the analysis have corroborated each other and thus can 
be considered largely accurate. Main concepts used in this thesis; integration, crisis 
management and food safety are the subject of significant discussion, both in the 
introduction and in chapter two. I will argue that the theoretical framework as outlined 
below in chapter three is suitable for the objective of this study, as it creates clear 
expectations that can be tested on the collected data. When investigating the effect of the 
Member States‟ involvement, a limited amount of data is available as the Council 
decision making is less accessible than that of other EU institutions. I therefore turn to 
alternative data sources to shed light on this part of the research question: member state 
responses to EU initiatives in former food crises and the Member State responses to the 
White Paper on Food Safety. However, I will argue that this is an appropriate use of data 
satisfying the demands for good validity. 
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1.3 Thesis Outline 
This thesis started by introducing the research question, presenting the methodological 
framework and discussing aspects of reliability and validity. The second chapter starts by 
outlining the main characteristics of crisis management and presents the development of 
the European food safety area. The third chapter presents the theoretical framework and 
empirical expectations based on each theory. The fourth, fifth and sixth chapters discuss 
the integration of food safety crisis management based on Intergovernmentalism, 
Historical Institutionalism, and an Environment-Based Perspective. The seventh chapter 
summarises the findings and concludes the discussion on the basis of the introductory 
hypothesises. 
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2. Crisis Management and the History of European 
Food Safety 
Through the last couple of decades the EU has developed crisis management capacities 
across a broad range of policy sectors (Boin et al. 2006a:1). The food safety area has 
been in the forefront of this process. As the world has become increasingly interwoven 
with people, goods and information crossing borders faster then ever before the level of 
importance of studying international crisis management has increased (see Boin 2004; 
Boin et al. 2006a; Rosenthal et al. 2001). Food policy making has long traditions in the 
European Union and can be traced back to the establishment of the Common Agricultural 
Policy in 1957. However, food safety and its subsequent crisis management has a much 
shorter history. It is essential for this thesis to establish a clear understanding of the 
implications of the term crisis management as well as the historical development of the 
European food safety area. 
This chapter will first clarify crisis management as a field of study. Second, it will outline 
the history of the food safety policy area. And third, it will present the EU level crisis 
management capacities established by the 2002 Regulation. 
2.1 Crisis Management 
Crisis management as a research field on its own has had two distinct traditional research 
focuses: First, a crisis has been seen as a “breaking point in a patterned process of 
linearity” based upon sociological and political science classic lines of inquiry; Second, 
the challenges faced by crisis managers in extraordinary crisis situations, characterised by 
stress and uncertainties have long been explored by social psychologists (Boin 
2004:167). There are two main types of disasters that can cause a crisis situation. First, 
there are the natural disasters, like the South Asian Tsunami in 2004 and Hurricane 
Katrina in the United States. Then, there are the man-made disasters where human error 
or lack of monitoring creates a situation that needs to be resolved by crisis management, 
for example the 1986 Chernobyl accident in Ukraine. However, more often there is a 
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combination of these two which causes a crisis situation, for example the European BSE 
Crisis, where a naturally occurring cattle disease becomes a major crisis because of the 
lack of clear and fast human response (Rosenthal et al. 2001:9). Also, crisis situations can 
harm both the public sector as well as the private sector. This makes modern crisis 
situations increasingly characterized by complexity, interdependence and politicisation. 
On the basis of the definition of crisis management presented in chapter one, several 
important characteristics are worth mentioning. First, crises are defined in terms of severe 
threats causing collective stress, which in the worst case can lead to serious injury and 
even death (Rosenthal et al. 2001:7). Nevertheless, what is a crisis to some, may be an 
opportunity to others, and can be used as a door opener for large scale changes in 
conservative systems. This implicates that crisis situations create multiple perceptions 
and definitions of the situation. Second, crisis situations are characterized by a high 
degree of uncertainty. This means that crises “disturb regularities, rendering normal 
conceptual anchors and rules of thumb quite useless, if not counterproductive” (Ibid.7). 
The most problematic uncertainty may be the element of surprise. This can paralyse and 
create a devastating loss of orientation for the crisis managers dealing with the situation. 
Third, in crisis situations there is a need for urgency, especially for managers who are 
responsible for making critical decisions. This urgency means that normal decision 
making procedures have to be put aside and more instinctive or routinized responses have 
to be made (Ibid. 8). 
2.1.1 Phases of Crisis Management 
Crisis management means management concerning non-routine development and 
phenomena. Such activities refer not only to the hectic moments of crisis decision 
making, but also the long-range prevention, preparation and recovery periods (Rosenthal 
et al. 2001:15). This means that crisis management is not only action-driven but includes 
a whole series of questions with no simple answers or easy techniques. 
Crisis management can be divided into four separate phases, each with its own set of 
challenges (Rosenthal et al. 2001:16; Boin et al. 2006a:25). First, the prevention phase 
which traditionally has been viewed as the most important focus. However, choosing 
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what preventive or preparatory policies to use is made difficult by the uncertainty about 
what crisis situation to expect. To solve this problem, balancing prevention and resilience 
is important, especially in an increasingly complex world (Rosenthal et al. 2001:16). 
Second, the planning phase, where the fear of surprise can lead to operational plans 
growing out of control by including every possible risk. Uncertainty and inconceivability 
are unavoidable in a world where natural disasters and risks are here to stay and 
increasingly interact in a dynamic way with man-made disasters (Boin et al. 2006a:26). A 
main challenge is to balance the institutional tendency to routinize crisis management 
practices and procedures, with the need for a flexible response in crisis situations 
(Rosenthal et al. 2001:17). 
Third is the response phase, where coping with dilemmas in the crisis situation itself is 
the main challenge. Common problems multiply exponentially and based on limited 
information managers have to decide if they are dealing with the full story or only signals 
of a future crisis (Boin et al. 2006a:28). The complexity of the crisis can create an unclear 
picture of what the actual threat is and by that make it harder to create a proper response 
(Rosenthal et al. 2001:18). Furthermore, in both the second and third phase of crisis 
management a central challenge is to decide on the level of institutionalization and what 
part and level of government should be responsible for dealing with the crisis situation 
when it occurs (Ibid.17). Fourth is the aftermath phase, where opportunity management 
is seen as a main challenge. The possibility to use the aftermath as a phase for politicians 
to create new opportunities to prevent similar crises from happening again makes crisis 
management inherently more political (Ibid. 20; Boin et al. 2006a:29-30). 
2.2 The History of European Food Safety Regulation 
The food area was one of the first areas subject to European level integration through the 
establishment of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) at the introduction of the Treaty 
of Rome in 1957 (Fouilleux 2003:247). In the following outline two main periods are 
focused on: First, the backdrop of the time period in focus, and second, an outline of the 
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development of food law, starting with the BSE Crisis and ending with the 2002 
Regulation.4 
2.2.1 Status Quo Ante5 
A first phase in this long integration process can be said to stretch from the early 1960s to 
the mid-1990s (Alemanno 2006:238; Millstone and Zwanenberg 2002:594). A main 
characteristic of this period was that the legislative framework of food law was primarily 
designed to answer economic rather than safety or societal concerns and there was no 
reference to food-related public health issues until the adoption of the Single European 
Act in 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (Alemanno 2006:239). 
During this period the European Community first pursued a harmonisation program 
consisting of adopting directives that set up compositional standards for food products, 
animated by the goal of establishing an internal market for foodstuffs. The process was 
dogged by problems, not only because national regulations on foodstuffs were 
profoundly diverse, but also owing to differences in administrative traditions (Ibid. 240-
241). This started to change in 1985 when the European Commission launched the New 
Approach to Harmonisation of national legislations (Europa website 2003a). The new 
approach relied on the mutual recognition principle as formulated by the European Court 
of Justice in the Cassis de Dijon judgment from 1979. According to this principle “(…) a 
member state should allow the free circulation in its territory of goods produced or 
marketed in conformity with the rules, tests or standards of another Member State that 
offer an equivalent level of protection to its own rules, tests, or standards” (Alemanno 
2006:241). This meant that finding common EU food quality requirements became 
redundant. Even so, the main focus of the European Community was the completion of 
the internal market, while European food law in general continued to develop in a 
fragmented fashion, with food safety a concern for its Member States (Ibid.243). 
                                              
4 Table 1 summarise the main policy papers, regulations and events important for this analysis. 
5 I owe this expression to Millstone and Zwanenberg (2002:594). 
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2.2.2 The BSE Crisis 
“(…) [T]he BSE Crisis constitutes one of the most difficult crises I have had to face 
throughout my career” - Jacques Santer (1997), President of the European 
Commission, addressing the European Parliament. 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) was first discovered and defined in the 
United Kingdom in November 1986. However, it was not before the British government 
in March 1996 issued a report stating that there was a possible connection between the 
cattle disease and the human affliction Creutzfeldt-Jakobs disease that it can be argued to 
take the shape of a crisis situation (Lezaun and Groenleer 2006:439). People could in fact 
get sick and die from consuming contaminated beef which the British government for 
years had told the public was risk-free to consume. After the publication of the report, 
public fears skyrocketed and the sale of beef went down by 70 percent in several 
countries (Grönvall 2001:155; Vos 2000:232). Because of the interconnected nature of 
the Common Agricultural Policy, an outbreak of animal disease in one of the European 
countries would almost automatically lead to costly intervention measures, giving it an 
important financial backdrop (Grönvall 2001:157). Also many of the neighbouring 
countries, like France and the Netherlands, feared that the outbreak of the disease could 
spread to their own beef markets (Ibid. 156). 
Soon after the British report was presented the discussions in the EU started on how to 
handle the situation. Several Member States immediately imposed unilateral bans on 
British beef; among them was France, while the European Commission‟s response was 
that there was a strong need to find a solution at the EU level (Boin et al. 2006a:42). 
When the British government learned that France had commenced unilateral action, they 
immediately turned to the European Commission with the message that they were willing 
to take the case to the European Court of Justice to end the ban if necessary (Grönvall 
2001:161). The European Commission‟s immediate reaction was that there was not 
enough evidence to impose bans and recommended to wait until the Scientific Veterinary 
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Committee6 had made its decision. When the Committee finally reached its decision it 
was rather inconclusive, but welcomed any practical measures taken by the European 
Commission. The latter immediately made the bans on beef implemented by eleven 
Member States legal (Ibid. 162). 
To gain control of the situation the European Commission decided that an EU-wide 
embargo on British beef was necessary. Though, this had to be considered by the 
Standing Veterinary Committee, consisting of the heads of food agencies in all fifteen 
Member States (Ibid. 162). It voted 14 to 1 in favour of an embargo on British beef and 
related products. This caused fury in British political circles and the British 
Commissioners Sir Leon Brittan and Neil Kinnock refused to sign the ratification of the 
decision before a new hearing had been held, leaving the European Commission 
paralysed. The next hearing changed nothing but confirmed the previous embargo. The 
Council gave its support to the European Commission, while the United Kingdom 
Minister of Agriculture, Douglas Hogg, refused to ratify the conclusions in the meeting 
(Ibid. 164). 
With no clear agreement on when and how to lift the embargo the British Prime Minister 
John Major announced that his government would introduce a policy of non-cooperation 
in all EU institutions. He furthermore emphasised that this decision was directed towards 
the Member States and not the European Commission (Lezaun and Groenleer 2006:440). 
During the month the “policy blockade” lasted, Britain stopped 117 measures in the 
Council by refusing to show up at meetings and cast votes. Even though steps were made 
on lifting the ban on beef related products, no real progress was made before the start of 
the Intergovernmental Conference in Florence in late June 1996. The EU and United 
Kingdom agreed on a framework for lifting the ban, imposing the slaughtering of 
100,000 cows on the latter. In August 1999 the ban on British beef was partially lifted 
(Grönvall 2001:166). 
                                              
6 The Scientific Veterinary Committee consists of independent veterinary experts from across the EU in charge of providing 
the European Commission with risk assessment (Grönvall 2001:160). See Section 2.3 for definition of risk assessment. 
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2.2.3 The BSE Crisis Aftermath 
The BSE Crisis was highly effective both in demonstrating the limits of human 
intervention in natural phenomena, the lack of crisis management competence at both 
Member State and EU level, as well as the problems faced when aiming for a unified EU 
response. The European Parliament launched a committee for a public inquiry into the 
European Commission‟s role throughout the crisis situation. The Committee‟s report was 
published in February 1997 and criticised the European Commission for neglecting its 
duties (European Parliament 1997). This lead to the European Commission announcing 
its New Approach to Consumer Health and Food Safety, moving the focus to food safety 
(European Commission 1997a; 1997b; Santer 1997; Vos 2000:234).  
As well as proposing an independent European food agency, three principles were 
important in reshaping the European Community approach to food law: First, “that 
responsibility for legislation should be separate from that for scientific consultation”; 
second, “that responsibility for legislation should be separate from that for inspection”; 
and third “that there would be greater transparency and more widely-available 
information throughout the decision-making process and inspection measures” 
(European Commission 1997a: 3). The Treaty of Amsterdam the same year reflected the 
proposed reorganisation of food law, with the exception of the establishment of a 
European food agency (Amsterdam 1997). 
A second major food crisis occurred in Europe during the late 1990s. In May 1999 the 
Belgian Government notified the European Commission that a heavy dioxin 
contamination of feeding stuffs in its poultry industry had been found (Lezaun and 
Groenleer 2006:441). When it became known that the Belgian Government had been 
aware of the danger for months without notifying European level authorities, it was 
accused for withholding information. However, the European Commission was quick to 
respond and an immediate meeting in the Standing Veterinary Committee led to 
emergency regulations being published less than a week after the notification (Boin et al. 
2006b:486). The Belgian Government which considered main parts of the emergency 
regulations an overreaction, initially refused to comply with the decision (Lezaun and 
Groenleer 2006:442). At a meeting in the European Parliament 16-17 June, the attitude 
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towards two Belgian Ministers was described as downright hostile, and the 
Commissioner for Consumer Protection and Agriculture, Emma Bonino slated the 
Belgian Government for its “chaotic” crisis management (Jukes 1999). The situation was 
not resolved before a new Belgian Government was elected in mid-June hearing renewed 
cooperating with the European Commission, and leading to the first lifting of bans in July 
1999. All bans on Belgian products were lifted in April 2000 (Lezauen and Groenleer 
2006:441). 
Even though what was described as a new food regime was launched immediately after 
the BSE Crisis, when facing new crisis situations it proved insufficient to restore public 
confidence (Vos 2000:242). Two years after the initial round of response, three scientists 
were tasked with creating a report on how to reform the exciting scientific advancing 
system. They suggested creating an independent European Food Authority (James et al. 
1999). This led to the publication of the White Paper on Food Safety which expressed the 
need for a major structural change, including establishing EU-level crisis management 
capacities (European Commission 2000a). 
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Table 1: Major events and important documents when analysing the integration of food safety crisis 
management between the 1996 BSE Crisis and the 2002 Regulation. This table is for empirical 
guidance only. 
 EU Development 
1996 March: The British Government announces suspect link between BSE and its human 
equivalent, Creutzfeldt-Jakobs disease. 
March: The European Community announces worldwide export ban on all British beef. 
May: United Kingdom begins policy of non co-operation with EU partners until the ban is lifted. 
June: European heads of Government agree to the Florence Framework for a strategy for the 
removal of the ban. 
1997 February: „European Parliament‟s report on the alleged contraventions or maladministration in the 
implementation of Community law in relations to BSE‟. 
February: „European Commission President Jacques Santer‟s speech to the European Parliament‟. 
April: „European Commission Communication on Consumer Health and Food Safety‟. 
April: „European Commission Green Paper on Food Law‟. 
1999 December: The Scientific Advice Report: „A European Food and Public Health Authority. The 
Future of Scientific Advice in the EU‟. 
July: More than three years after the start of the trade blockade, the European Commission 
announces an easing of the British export ban. 
May-July: The Belgian Dioxin Chicken Crisis: EU emergency measures were implemented after a 
heavy dioxin contamination of feeding stuffs had been found in the Belgian poultry industry. 
2000 January: „European Commission White Paper on Food Safety‟. 
February: „Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle‟. 
March: Germany agrees to lift the ban on British beef. 
2001 December: The European Court of Justice rules the French ban on British beef illegal. 
2002 January: ‘Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 
laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European 
Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety’. 
2004 April: Corrigendum to European Commission decision concerning the adoption of a general plan 
for food/feed crisis management. 
Source: Alemanno 2006; BBC News 2001b; Jukes website 
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2.3 The 2002 Regulation 
After two years of negotiations, the White Paper had been transformed into a proposal for 
a regulation “laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, 
establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters 
of food safety” (European Communities 2002). The regulation was aimed at addressing 
all aspects of food safety at the European level by laying down a horizontally broad 
European food policy. This covered all stages of production, processing and distribution 
of food and feed. However, it is important to note that several of the measures finally 
established with the 2002 Regulation emerged gradually and partially informally 
throughout the research time-frame in focus. Two overriding principles were to guide the 
new European Community food regime. First, its Member States should seek to achieve a 
high level of protection of human health and consumer‟s interests and, second, ensure the 
effective functioning of the internal market (Ibid. Art. 5). 
Also important to mention are two overriding organisational principles that guided the 
development of institutional arrangements for the 2002 Regulation. First, risk analysis 
was to be the guiding principle for the organisation of all parts of the food safety area, 
including crisis management (Ibid. Art. 6). Risk is conventionally defined as a 
“probability, not necessarily calculable in practice, of adverse consequences” (Hood et 
al. 2001:3). Commonly, and as used in the food safety area, risk analysis means a process 
consisting of three interconnected components: risk assessment; risk management; and 
risk communication7 (European Communities 2002: Article 3). Second, in cases where 
all available information has been assessed and the possibility of harmful effects on 
health is identified, the precautionary principle can be used to implement provisional 
crisis management measures (Ibid. Art. 7). 
                                              
7 „Risk assessment‟ is the determination of the value of risk related to a concrete situation and recognised threat. „Risk 
management‟ means the process, distinct from „risk assessment‟, of weighing policy alternatives and selecting appropriate 
prevention and control options if needed. „Risk communication‟ “means the interactive exchange of information and 
options throughout the risk analysis process (…) [among] interested parties, including the explanation of risk assessment 
findings and the basis of risk management decisions” (Codex Alimentarius 2001; European Communities 2002: Article 
3:11-13). 
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The main attention will be directed towards measures implemented affecting the planning 
and response phase. Though, because of the interconnected nature of the phases of crisis 
management described, it is difficult to isolate these two phases. They will therefore be 
analysed in the broader context of the development of EU food safety regulations. The 
2002 Regulation measures concerning crisis management can be divided into three 
categories: crisis situation decision making procedures; scientific advice in crisis 
situations; and crisis response capacities. 
Crisis Situation Decision Making Procedures 
The 2002 Regulation reorganised the regulatory committees responsible for food safety 
within a single new structure, the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal 
Health8 (Ibid. (62)). The new Standing Committee which holds a key role in decision 
making on food safety issues, consists of representatives from the Member States and is 
chaired by a European Commission representative. Its mandate covers the entire food 
supply chain, including crisis management measures, enhancing its ability to target risks 
to health wherever they arise in the production of food (European Commission website1). 
Scientific Advice in Crisis Situations 
The 2002 Regulation established the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) as an 
independent European level scientific advisory body. The tasks of the new authority 
were: First, to “provide the European level institutions and the Member States with the 
best possible scientific opinions (...)”; Second, to promote and coordinate the 
development of a uniform risk assessment; Third, to undertake action to identify and 
characterise emerging risks; Fourth, “to provide scientific and technical assistance (...) in 
the crisis management procedures implemented by the Commission with regard to the 
safety of food and feed” (European Communities 2002:Art. 23a,b,f,h). This gives the 
EFSA an important advisory role in crisis situations. 
                                              
8 The new Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health replaced the existing Standing Veterinary 
Committee, the Standing Committee on Foodstuffs, the Standing Committee on Animal Nutrition and parts of the Standing 
Committee on Plant Health (European Commission website1). 
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Crisis Response Capacities 
Several provisions made with the 2002 Regulation were important in creating a common 
crisis response capacity. First, it extended the existing notification system that had been 
in place since 1979 to also include feed and by that established the Rapid Alert System 
for Food and Feed. This system is made for “notification of a direct or indirect risk to 
human health deriving from food or feed (...). The Member States, the Commission and 
the Authority shall each designate a contact point which shall be a member of the 
network” (Ibid. Art. 50). In other words, this system aims at being the central information 
sharing unit where both the status of the emergency and the actions taken by the 
competent authorities of the affected Member States are being shared. 
Second, the European Commission is also granted a greater role in the implementation of 
emergency measures for food and feed of Community origin. 
Where it is evident that food or feed originating in the Community or imported from 
a third country is likely to constitute a serious risk to human health, animal health, 
or the environment, and that such risk cannot be contained satisfactorily by means of 
measure taken by the Member State(s) concerned, the Commission, acting in 
accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 58(2) on its own initiative or 
at the request of a Member State, shall immediately adopt one or more of the 
following measures, depending on the gravity of the situation: 
(a) in the case of food or feed of Community origin: 
(i) suspension of the placing on the market of use of the food in question; 
(ii) suspension of the placing on the market or use in the feed in question; 
(iii) laying down special conditions for the food or feed in question; 
(iv) any other appropriate interim measure; (...) 
(Ibid. Arts. 53.1a-b) 
These measures may provisionally be adopted after consulting the member state(s) 
concerned and informing the other Member States (Ibid. Art. 53.2). This gives the 
European Commission a greater influence on what provisions to adopt in the absence of 
unanimity between all the Member States. However, it is still possible for Member States 
to implement interim protective measures unilaterally (Ibid. Art. 54.1). 
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Third, if the European Commission “identifies a situation involving a serious direct or 
indirect risk to human health deriving from food or feed (…)” it can immediately set up a 
Crisis Unit “(…) in which the EFSA shall participate and provide scientific and technical 
assistance if necessary” (Ibid. Art. 56.1-2). The Crisis Unit is responsible for collecting 
and evaluating information and to identify available options to prevent, eliminate or 
reduce to an acceptable level the risk to human health as rapid and effective as possible. 
The crisis unit shall also play an important role in keeping the public informed about the 
risks involved and the measures taken (Ibid. Art. 57.1-3). 
2.3.1 Summary 
The 2002 Regulation enhanced the EU level‟s management capacities and coordinative 
functions for responding to food crisis situations. Decision making was streamlined to 
cover the entire food chain and a new EU level food safety authority (EFSA) was created 
to provide the decision makers with independent scientific advice. Existing crisis 
response capacities were extended to cover new areas and the European Commission was 
given the opportunity to implement interim emergency measures and a crisis unit. Both 
the precautionary principle and risk analysis were implemented in all parts of the food 
safety area and were especially important for the crisis management capacities. The 
changes to crisis measures and management principles made by the 2002 Regulation are 
summarised in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Changes of food safety crisis management measures made by the 2002 Regulation. 
Measures and 
management 
principles 
Before the 2002 Regulation 2002 Regulation 
(European Communities 2002) 
Food Crisis 
Situation Decision 
Making 
Procedures 
Four committees with overlapping 
responsibilities in crises: 
- The Standing Veterinary 
Committee 
- The Standing Committee on 
Animal Nutrition 
- The Standing Committee on 
Foodstuffs 
- The Standing Committee on 
Plant Health 
(European Commission 
website1) 
One committee with enhanced mandate 
covering the entire food chain: 
- The Standing Committee on the 
Food Chain and Animal Health 
(Art. 58-59). 
Scientific Advice 
in Crisis 
Situations 
National food safety agencies and 
Scientific Committees under the 
European Commission provided the 
EU level with scientific advice (Vos 
1999:147). 
The European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA) as an independent EU level 
scientific body is responsible for 
providing the decision makers with 
scientific advice in crisis situations (Art. 
22-23). 
Crisis Response 
Capacities 
EU Rapid Alert System for food was 
responsible for sharing information 
notifying risk to human health 
between the European Commission 
and the Member States (European 
Commission website2). 
The European Commission could 
implement emergency measures only 
when supported by a majority of the 
Member States (Vos 1999:163). 
EU Rapid Alert System for food and feed 
responsible for sharing information and 
notifying risk to human health between 
the European Commission, the Member 
States and the EFSA (Art. 50). 
The European Commission can 
implement interim emergency measures 
on its own initiative after consulting with 
the Member State(s) concerned. 
However, within ten working days this 
measure has to be confirmed by the 
Member States (Art. 53.2). 
When identifying situations involving a 
serious risk to human health the 
European Commission can set up a crisis 
unit responsible for collecting and 
evaluating available information and 
informing the public (Art. 56-57). 
The 
Precautionary 
Principle 
Introduced in the Green Paper on 
Food Safety (1997:7) as a guiding 
principle when full risk assessment is 
not possible. Further scrutinised in 
the Communication on the 
Precautionary Principle (European 
Commission 2000b). 
The precautionary principle can be used 
to implement provisional crisis 
management measures when all available 
information has been assessed and the 
possibility of harmful effects on health is 
identified (Art. 7). 
Risk Analysis Introduced in the Communication on 
Consumer Health and Food Safety 
(1997b:19) as a guiding food safety 
principle in response to the BSE 
Crisis. 
Full risk analysis is a fundamental 
principle for the organisation of all parts 
of the food safety area, including crisis 
management (Art. 6). 
Sources: European Commission 1997b; 2000b; website1; European Communities 2002; Vos 1999 
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3. Theoretical Framework 
This chapter presents the theoretical perspectives that together with the empirical data 
create the basis for the analysis of this thesis. The main theoretical arguments are 
presented, the decision to apply these specific theories is explained, and the relevance the 
theories have for the research question and the empirical data is explored. This is 
followed by a summary of what sort of expectation we can derive from each theory.9 
3.1 The Intergovernmental Perspective 
3.1.1 Main Theoretical Arguments 
Intergovernmentalism is based on the assumption that the Member States (rather than the 
EU authorities) are the ones who set down the premise on which the development of the 
EU takes place and who make all the important decisions (Cram 2001:60). This means 
that the main institutions in focus are the ones where the Member States‟ representatives 
meet, i.e. the intergovernmental arenas such as the Council or the Intergovernmental 
Conferences (Cini 2003:94-97). The European Commission and the European Parliament 
will avoid proposing policy that differs from the wishes of the Member States. Proposals 
that contradict the Member States‟ fundamental interests will be rejected. By putting the 
states in focus when studying politics, this approach is in compliance with classical 
international relations theory (Cram 2001:60). The Intergovernmental Perspective can be 
understood as part of the neo-realism approach to interstate bargaining. It describes states 
as rational consistent actors which negotiate zero-sum agreements shaped by the relative 
state power within the regime (Cini 2003:94-95). The strongest state is the ruling state. 
This makes the relative power between state A and state B an important research focus 
(Ibid. 95; Cram 2001:60). 
                                              
9 The idea for the structure of this chapter is derived from Skjerven (2005). 
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A central concept for the Intergovernmental Approach is national sovereignty. Often used 
as a synonym for „independence‟, this is important for the EU discourse in many 
European countries. According to Intergovernmentalism, the Member States manage to 
involve themselves in European integration without ceding sovereignty, letting them 
keep the control of the policy development process. Instead of a transfer of sovereignty 
from the national to the supranational level, European cooperation is a process of pooling 
or sharing of sovereignty (Cini 2003:96). The international community is anarchic, and 
all attempts to create order and cooperation have to be based on the intention between 
states to do this and not on international organisations alone. Even so, 
Intergovernmentalism accepts that there is a delegation of some functions from the 
Member State executives to the European institutions, when national governments realise 
that it is in their interest to hand over certain regulatory functions to ease co-operation 
(Ibid.). 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
In the early 1990s the Intergovernmental Perspective was reformulated and modified by 
Andrew Moravcsik creating what has become known as Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
(Schimmelfennig 2004:75). Moravcsik saw the EU integration process as a result of the 
power and preferences of the Member States. This theory has two separate dimensions, 
the supply and the demand sides. There are underlying societal factors in each country 
demanding cooperation on areas of importance and there is a supply of integration arising 
out of interstate negotiations (Moravcsik 1998:24). To explain this relationship the theory 
has been divided into three steps: The first step is a liberal approach to national 
preference formation, where policy is constrained by the interests of dominant, mostly 
economic, groups within society. It is not the relative position in the state system that is 
important - it is the domestic politics of each member state (Ibid. 25). Second, Moravcsik 
adds a level of EU-level intergovernmental bargaining. At this level states are seen as 
unitary actors and the relative power between them is shaped above all by asymmetrical 
interdependence, which decides the relative value of agreement to different governments 
(Ibid. 51). Third, Moravcsik emphasizes “the importance of credible commitments” 
(Ibid. 67). The main argument is that international institutions are set up to improve the 
 37 
efficiency of interstate bargaining and secure the substantive bargains they have made 
(Cini 2003:104). 
Together these three elements give the following conclusions (Cini 2003:105): First, that 
choices made in favour of European integration are a reflection of the preferences of the 
national governments and not of the supranational organisations. Secondly, these 
interests reflect a balance of domestic economic interests. Finally, the outcome of each 
negotiation reflects the bargaining power of the Member States, and that the delegation of 
decision-making authority to supranational institutions reflects the wishes of the state 
government to ensure that the commitments made were adhered to. 
Criticism of Intergovernmentalism 
As Liberal Intergovernmentalism represents a partial criticism of the traditional 
Intergovernmental Perspective, several other criticisms are worth mentioning. First, the 
empirical argumentation has been criticised for being too heavily based on historical 
decisions and too little on the routine decisions made in the EU. By focusing on the last 
phases in the decision making process the result is that the informal networks might be 
given too little attention, and potentially important integrating powers are being 
overlooked (Egeberg 2004:200). Deliberationists and constructivists would in this respect 
highlight the role that arguments and persuasion might play (Eriksen and Fossum 2000). 
Second, the criticism concerns Intergovernmentalism overlooking the major EU level 
institutions, like the European Commission and  the European Parliament, as well as the 
role of interest groups in the decision making process (Egeberg 2004:200). The main 
argument about the importance of relative power between the different Member States 
has also been criticised. The Intergovernmental Perspective takes it for granted that it is 
the economically stronger Member States which can expect to have the most influence 
over negotiations and in the integration processes, while the economically weaker 
Member States have less influence (Skjerven 2005). 
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3.1.2 Expectations Based on the Intergovernmental Perspective 
As my research question and the first hypothesis (Hypothesis A) outline, the 
Intergovernmental Perspective will be applied to create a basis for discussing the effect 
of the EU Member States. The expectations will mainly be drawn from the classical 
version of the intergovernmental perspective. However, Moravcsik‟s Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism will function as a helpful guiding framework. 
Moravcsik‟s second level, intergovernmental bargaining, and third level, the 
establishment of credible commitments will inform the discussion. The 
Intergovernmental Perspective‟s basic assumption is that it is the Member States that 
have been the central actors, making their relative influence on food safety crisis 
management a central focus of studies. As there is limited data available on the Council 
processes in the 2002 Regulation preface, an alternative research approach is needed. 
Attention is directed towards the contemporary backdrop focusing on crises situations 
occurring within the relevant period for the research, the BSE Crisis and the Dioxin 
Chicken Crisis, and the response of the main Member States involved. Major countries in 
the EU15, like the United Kingdom and France, would according to 
Intergovernmentalism have relatively more influence on EU crisis management decisions 
than weaker Member States, like Belgium. A clear difference in Member States‟ response 
to EU initiatives can be taken as indications of their relative power being important in the 
food safety area. 
To investigate the Member States‟ attitudes towards the new EU crisis management 
capacities attention can be directed towards the Member State responses to the White 
Paper creating the basis for the 2002 Regulation. As food safety crisis management can 
be argued to be highly sensitive for the Member States, opposition towards new EU level 
initiatives can be expected. However, to ease controversy and to let the Member States 
keep a „hand on the wheel‟, control mechanisms and „emergency brakes‟ can be 
established. This is done by institutional design which makes it possible to integrate 
crisis management on the EU level despite it being seen as fundamental national interest. 
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To summarise, the following expectations can be drawn from the Intergovernmental 
Perspective: 
 It is the Member States that make the decision to integrate food safety crisis 
management on the EU level. It should therefore be possible to find evidence that: 
o The Member States‟ relative power base has been important for their 
ability to modify disputed EU food crisis measures. 
o The Member States have opposed new EU level measures that would 
reduce their control on food safety crisis management as it can be argued 
to be a vital area for them to manage well. 
 To keep any build up of crisis management capacities on the EU level in check, it 
is pertinent to expect that the 2002 Regulation has utilised institutional design to 
establish control mechanisms and emergency brakes for the Member States. 
3.2 The Institutional Perspective 
As basis for my discussion of the EU level institutions‟ influence on the integration of 
food safety crisis management a New Institutionalism based approach will be applied. 
New Institutionalism can hardly be viewed as a single theoretical perspective, but all 
New Institutionalists agree that institutions do matter (Rosamond 2003:114; Pollack 
2005:362). More specifically, a Historical Institutional approach, as described in the 
following section, will be used. 
3.2.1 Theoretical Main Arguments 
Within the wider framework of New Institutionalism there are different takes on how 
institutions matter. Hall and Taylor (1996:5; Rosamond 2003:115-117) describe a 
threefold theoretical generation of ideas, with Rational Choice Institutionalism on one 
side, based on the idea that human beings are self-seeking and behave rationally, and 
Sociological Institutionalism on the other side, which focuses on the „culture‟ of 
institutions and the role of persuasion and communicative action. Between these two 
perspectives Historical Institutionalism can be found, focusing on how institutional 
choices have long-term effects. The following theoretical outline and discussion can 
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principally be placed under the latter holding insights on both the rival Rationalist and 
the Sociological Institutionalism research approach (Pollack 2004:139). 
Selznick (1997:19) describes the difference between institutions and organisations by 
saying that the organisation is the framework and structure of the institutions, so that all 
institutions are organisations, but not all organisations are institutions. By adapting to 
internal and external demand and pressure an organisation can grow gradually more 
complex through the development of informal values, norms and routines, and thereby 
become an institution. Because each institution‟s context and adapting differ, the 
institutional „soul‟ becomes unique. Furthermore, the organisation can also get additional 
functions so that it is not only an agent for someone, but its existence is also a goal in 
itself. An organisation has to be „infused‟ with values beyond the technical demands to 
qualify as an institution. Through time an administrative culture unique for each 
institution will develop, and create stability (Ibid. 25-26). This leads to an idea of norms-
based institutions. 
The Institution as an Actor 
Identification with an organisational unit could mean that the unit‟s norms, objectives, 
goals and ways of doing things are value-indices which more or less automatically guide 
an official‟s proposals and decisions (Egeberg and Sætren 1999:94). In other words, the 
actors are tied up by the established institutional structure in a way that makes them 
commit to the institution‟s ideas and goals. This is supported by Hellebø (2004:9) which 
states that “food regulation and food control can be seen as reflecting certain norms, 
values and objectives which are embodied in certain institutions formed over time in 
different contexts”. The theory‟s assumption about who decides the policy outcome in the 
EU is of great importance for my research question. In opposition to the 
Intergovernmental Perspective, Historical Institutionalism argue that the European level 
institutions can influence the participating decision makers‟ interests, preferences and 
identities, which again influence the choice of political measures, outcomes and 
structures (Egeberg 2004:200; Pollack 2005:362). This argument is especially directed 
towards the role of the European Commission, but will in this analysis also be applied to 
the European Parliament. 
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Historical Institutionalism has been seen as having dual effects, “(…) influencing both 
the constraints on individual actors and their preferences, and thereby encompassing the 
core insights of both the rationalist and constructivist camps” (Pollack 2005:363). This 
means that EU institutions and policies can become locked in as a result of both the 
incremental growth of support for existing institutions from below and change-resistant 
institutions from above, as actors develop an interest in the continuation of specific EU 
policies (Ibid. 364). The ongoing nature of institutional interests, with special preference 
for self-preservation and even creating new tasks to achieve this, leads the European 
Commission and the European Parliament to embrace new European level initiatives 
(Rosamond 2003:116). 
Institutional Change 
Historical Institutionalism does not rule out the institutional environment and conflicting 
interests of current actors as factors contributing to institutional change. But they 
emphasise the historical experience made that transforms into rules, routines and forms 
which persist beyond the historical moment (March and Olsen 1989:166-168). It is 
argued that the choices made early in the history of any policy, or in any governmental 
system, and the institutionalised commitments that grow out of them will determine 
subsequent decisions (Peters 2005:19-20). In other words, we need to understand the 
initial decisions made on a policy area to understand the logic of the development of the 
policy. This is referred to as path dependency, which means that once a policy is 
launched on a path it will remain in the same path until a significant force intervenes and 
diverts it from the already established direction (Thelen 1999:387). It does not mean that 
this path can not be altered, but it demands a good deal of political pressure to produce 
that change. The argument presented here emerges from Institutional Sociology, where 
institutions are viewed as embodying shared cultural understandings of the way the world 
works. 
Even though institutions do not adapt instantaneously or efficiently to minor changes in 
will, power or circumstances, sudden exogenous shocks or crisis situations can cause 
radical and swift transformations (March and Olsen 1989; Olsen 1992:16). The more 
inefficient and the less prepared the institution is the more likely will it be that the current 
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institutional arrangement collapses letting a new regime arise. Olsen (Ibid.17) 
summarises the argument like this: “Radical and swift transformations are only likely in 
the case of comprehensive shocks, significant performance crisis and large gaps between 
existing structures and underlying realities – which, in turn, depend on inefficient routine 
processes of adaptation”. As this can create altering effects for the institutional core, it 
can also be used as a „window of opportunity‟ by actors centrally located in the decision 
making process to steer the change in a wanted direction. 
Criticism of Institutionalism 
In addition to the debate between scholars advocating different versions of New 
Institutionalism, several critics have raised their voices against the use of the Historical 
Institutionalism perspective on EU integration. A central assumption within the 
Institutional approach is that the European Commission has worked to gain increased 
independence from the Member States, and by this emphasising the EU institutions‟ 
autonomy while underlining the national governments limitations. The Member States 
cannot exert total control over the decision making process because they lack the 
necessary representation and overview of the process. The objection against this 
argument is that major EU Member States will be able to reach their goals anyway, since 
they have the resources to produce the necessary documentation needed, in for example, 
expert committees and by this question whether independent expert representation 
actually exists (See Neyer 1999:221-222). Another criticism that has been directed 
towards the Institutional Perspective is that it has had little faith in the Member States‟ 
ability to influence the EU development in the last decade (Rosamond 2003:116). Some 
argue that the Member States have actually strengthened their influence in the decision 
making process in recent years, by creating new control mechanisms for the EU level 
institutions, especially the European Commission. This makes an analysis of the 
European Commission‟s role throughout the research time frame especially important 
(Skjerven 2005). 
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3.2.2 Expectations Based on Historical Institutionalism 
Based on Historical Institutionalism the European Commission and the European 
Parliament can be expected to have developed into institutions with a set of common 
norms that prescribe appropriate behaviour affecting policy outcomes. By the incremental 
growth of support for existing institutions from below and change-resistant institutions 
from above, they may have become „locked in‟ as actors develop interests for the 
continuation of EU policies. Consequently it can be expected that the European 
Commission and the European Parliament by appearing as supranational leaders with a 
self preserving agenda would promote increased EU level food safety crisis management 
measures. To investigate this expectation, three approaches will be used: The EU 
institutions‟ definitions of who the emergency constitutes a crisis for; the EU institutions‟ 
food safety policy reform initiatives; and how the final 2002 Regulation measures can 
reflect the EU institutions‟ self preserving interest. 
Historical Institutionalism argues that historical trends and decisions should be in focus 
when investigating institutional change. It should be possible to find evidence that the 
integration of crisis management is influenced by decisions taken in the early stages of 
the development of the food policy area. According to Olsen (1992) external crises can 
cause institutions to change and it should therefore be possible to find evidence that 
crises affecting the food area within the research time frame have had an altering effect 
on crisis management. 
To summarise, the following expectations can be drawn from Historical Institutionalism: 
 The European Commission and the European Parliament have a self preserving 
agenda and would therefore act as supranational leaders to promote and embrace 
EU level food safety crisis management measures and suppress the interests of 
powerful Member States. This can be seen in how: 
o the EU institutions‟ definition of who the emergencies constitute a crisis 
for is reformulated and consequently transforming it from a national crisis 
to a European crisis; 
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o the EU institutions‟ food safety policy reform initiatives move crisis 
management towards European level; and 
o The 2002 Regulation measures reflect the institutional self interest of the 
European Commission and the European Parliament. 
Two expectations about institutional change should be discussed separately: 
 Policy decisions made on an earlier point of time have influenced later decisions, 
the following policy outcome and institutional arrangement, referred to as path 
dependency; and 
 Crisis situations, like abrupt events and catastrophes in the surroundings, have had 
an arbitrative effect and forced the institutional arrangement to change fast. This 
may be used as a „window of opportunity‟ to implement integrative measures by 
the European Commission and the European Parliament. 
3.3 The Environment Based Perspective 
In the traditional study of European integration the concept of norms plays a minor role. 
However, the EU is part of a wider pattern of policy making beyond the nation state 
(Wallace 2000:7). The following perspective will therefore draw on the study of 
organisations, emphasising the relationship between an organisation and its environment. 
By employing this perspective I will derive expectations on the role of norms in the EU‟s 
environment in the integration of crisis management in the food safety area.10 
3.3.1 Theoretical Main Arguments 
When studying institutions, the broader normative and cultural environment can be said 
to be of interest. Institutions can be seen as reflections of the will of actors initiating them 
as well as reflections of their institutional or organisational environment. Organisations 
are continuously being confronted with socially created expectations and ideas in their 
environment on how they should be organised, referred to as myths. When organisations 
                                              
10 The structure of the theoretical outline of the Environment Perspective is derived from Bonarjee (2007). 
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adapt to the myths in their environment they grow more alike, causing isomorphism 
among them (Christensen et al. 2004:66). 
 In the globalised society of today, organisations often have multiple sources of 
expectations that are incompatible. Common to these expectations on how organisations 
should function is that they are rationalised by scientific arguments to convince 
managers that they are an effective means of achieving specific organisational goals. 
Also, that they are institutionalised in the sense that regardless of their actual effect, their 
value is taken for granted (Ibid. 67). The spread of ideas between organisations is made 
possible because they are immaterial concepts that can be adapted independently from 
time and space. 
The Environment Perspective claim institutions gain their legitimacy by incorporating 
norms from the broader society. However, advocates of this perspective differ on the 
mechanisms that result in an institutional adaptation to the environment (Ibid. 81). Meyer 
and Rowan (1991:50) argue that institution‟s legitimacy is gained by reflecting societal 
values rather than adhering to technical demands, hence they will change as they adapt to 
society. 
“(…) organizations are driven to incorporate the practices and procedures defined by 
prevailing rationalized concepts of organizational work and institutionalized in society. 
Organizations that do so increase their legitimacy and their survival prospects, 
independent of the immediate efficacy of the acquired practices and procedures” 
(Meyer and Rowan 1991:41). 
To find explanations on why there has been an EU integration of crisis management in 
the food safety area, the values of its broader institutional environment has to be 
investigated. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991:67-96) describe three reasons organisations might have to 
adopt ideas from its environment as follows: First, pressure can be exerted by one 
organisation to the next, here referred to as external pressure. Second, uncertainty within 
an organisation relating to its functions and goals may cause it to mimic similar 
organisations in its environment, here referred to as imitation. Third, as professions 
spread between organisations, they bring with them ideas and values from one 
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organisation to the next creating change in the structure, causing them to grow more 
alike. Because data will not be collected on the individual level, the latter mechanism will 
not be elaborated further here. Emphasis will be put on the first two mechanisms of 
DiMaggio and Powell (Ibid. 67), and on how the European Commission as an important 
external actor employs such myths. Because the environment based perspective is not an 
integration theory, but is drawn from organisational theory, it does not have any 
provisions as to which actors are to be considered more important. Instead, myths are 
seen as the driving forces when organisations change. 
3.3.2 Expectations Based on the Environment Perspective 
A central presumption based on the Environment Perspective is that it is an idea rather 
than an actor that is steering institutional reform. Therefore, to understand the integration 
of crisis management in the food safety area we need to look beyond the office buildings 
in Brussels and the European capitals and explore the degree to which myths have 
affected the actors in this process. Based on this perspective one might expect that ideas 
originating in the institutional environment have guided European actors as they form the 
institutions responsible for crisis management. 
The EU‟s institutional environment in the food area includes several framework setting 
international institutions and it is therefore pertinent to expect that it also consists of a 
variety of expectations and organisational ideas. As will be outlined further in chapter 
six, attention will be directed towards the World Trade Organization (WTO) Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Agreement implemented in 1995 and the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission. During the period in focus these institutions were the arena for an extensive 
food safety debate and established several basic ideas and norms with implications for 
crisis management, like risk assessment procedures and the precautionary principle. 11 
The European Commission played an important external role participating in the 
establishment of the WTO food safety regulatory regime and held an observatory status 
in the Codex Alimentarius Commission. 
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Based on the environment perspective one might expect that institutional ideas 
established at the WTO level have influenced the EU‟s institutional reform, as a result of 
imitation. As the EU food safety area is a relatively new construction, it can be expected 
to mirror successful institutional arrangements in its environment. However, the EU is 
also tied to its institutional environment by international agreements making the spread of 
ideas as a result of external pressure another expectation derived from the Environment 
Perspective. 
To summarise, the following expectations can be drawn from the Environment 
Perspective: 
 The integration of food safety crisis management has been caused by the 
European institutions adapting to organisational ideas and expectations 
originating in the institution environment, here focusing on the WTO SPS 
Agreement and the Codex Alimentarius Commission. 
Two main ways in which institutional ideas spread between institutions are 
investigated: 
 First, institutional ideas have spread as a result of an imitation process and it 
should therefore be possible to find evidence of the European Commission 
utilising lessons learned from the institutional environment. 
 Second, institutional ideas have spread as a result of external pressure, especially 
by the binding WTO SPS Agreement. 
                                                                                                                                           
11 See section 2.3 for explanation of risk assessment and the precautionary principle. 
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4. The Member States 
This chapter‟s aim is to discuss the influence of the national level, the Member States, in 
the EU integration of food safety crisis management. The Member States constitute the 
corner stones of the EU decision making structure and through the Council and the 
Intergovernmental Conferences national interests are represented (Lewis 2003:150). As 
attention is directed towards the role of the Member States, the following discussion will 
be based on the Intergovernmental Perspective as it was presented in chapter three. 
This chapter will have a twofold approach to the research question. First, it will 
investigate the backdrop of the integration process in focus by studying the Member State 
responses to EU measures in former food crises. Second, it will discuss the 
intergovernmental claim stating that European integration only happens when it does not 
conflict with the Member States‟ interests. Consequently, Member State control 
mechanisms and emergency brakes created by institutional design should be evident in 
the 2002 Regulation. 
4.1 Member State Influence in Earlier Food Crises 
4.1.1 Promoting National Interests 
Three conflicts between the national level and the European Commission relating to food 
crises can be used to shed light on the Member States‟ influence in the food safety area. 
They are chosen as they are the main food safety crisis management disputes occurring 
within the research time frame. First, and as outlined in chapter two, the British 
Government protested heavily against the implementation of a common EU response to 
the BSE Crisis (Grönvall 2001:164; Lezaun and Groenleer 2006:439). This reached its 
peak when the British Prime Minister John Major introduced a policy of non-cooperation 
in all EU institutions that lasted for a month. By putting national interests first, Major 
satisfied his domestic audience by promoting arguments from the British scientific 
advisory bodies that had given their beef the green light (Grönvall 2001:165). 
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Second, while the other thirteen Member States that had imposed a ban on British beef 
aligned with the European Commission‟s decision in 1999 to lift it, the French 
Government refused to do so (BBC News 2002a). This was reasoned as a response to the 
concerns from its own independent food agency about the reliability of the British 
systems in place to keep its food safe and by that protect the health of its own citizens. 
British farmers on the other hand accused the French Government of taking a purely 
political move based on unjustified public fears and promoting protectionism (BBC 
News 2001a). It was not before 2002, more then six years after it was initially imposed 
and after the European Court of Justice had declared it illegal, that the French 
Government finally decided to lift the ban (BBC News 2002b). 
Third and as outlined in chapter two, the 1999 Belgian response to the Dioxin Chicken 
Crisis was different than those of the two previous EU crisis management disputes 
elaborated above, where political measures were made use of to stop or change the 
European Commission‟s proposals. The Belgian Government on the other hand was 
heavily criticised for not taking the situation serious, and in fact slowing down the 
implementation of EU food crisis response initiatives (Lezaun and Groenleer 2006:442). 
Instead of actively promoting national interests the Belgian Government chose to adopt a 
passive position. 
As the Intergovernmental Perspective emphasise the Member States‟ relative political 
and economical influence as an important factor in EU integration, it can be expected that 
strong Member States would utilise their power base to protest EU measures 
contradicting their domestic interests. This can be argued to be evident in the three cases 
briefly outlined above. Both the United Kingdom and France12 are large Member States 
with a strong political and economical base backing their government (Laffan and Stubb 
2003:73-78). The British Government utilised its powers when opposing EU food crisis 
measures, putting substantial pressure on the EU system by introducing the no 
cooperation strategy (Grönvall 2001:165). The French Government were able to hold on 
                                              
12 France and the United Kingdom can both be categorised as large EU Member States, both holding populations close to 
60 millions and two of the largest European economies (Laffan and Stubb 2003:73-78). 
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to its ban on British beef another 2.5 years, despite heavy pressure from other Member 
States and the European Commission. It was not before the European Court of Justice 
ruled against the ban that it was lifted. Consequently, smaller Member States have less 
chance of successfully protesting EU level proposals as they are relatively weaker then 
their counterparts. This can be argued to be the case for the Belgian response to the 
Dioxin Chicken Crisis, as a medium sized member state.13 Instead of taking an active 
approach attempting to change the European Commission‟s crisis management proposals, 
as especially Britain had done in the BSE Crisis, it was accused of being too passive and 
postponing measures on the national level. The difference in level of member state 
protests towards EU food crisis management measures can be viewed as an indication of 
relative power playing a role in the food safety area. 
4.1.2 EU Decision Making Overriding National Interests 
Even though it is possible to differentiate the level of protests between more and less 
powerful Member States targeted by EU crisis management measures, the question of the 
European Commission‟s ability to override the protests in the decision making process is 
essential. The Intergovernmental Perspective puts the Member States at the centre stage 
of European integration and it can consequently be expected that the delegation of 
functions to the EU institutions only happens when national governments sees it is in 
their interest to hand over certain regulatory functions to ease co-operation (Cini 
2003:96). 
In the three cases above, the Member States in question oppose the decisions on EU crisis 
measures and argue that the decisions go against Member States‟ fundamental interests. 
Despite this, the European Commission were able to gather sufficient support to get their 
proposed measures implemented and by that override the Member States directly 
affected. Strong Member States like France and Britain utilised their power to actively 
promote their national interests and opposed the EU decisions. However, even though 
                                              
13 Belgium can be classified as a medium EU Member State, with a population of 10 million and a medium sized economy 
(Laffan and Stubb 2003:73-78). 
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they were able to promote counter arguments and delay the proposed food crises 
measures, they were not successful in changing or stopping them. As an important 
backdrop for the further analysis the EU level decision making system overriding the 
Member States goes against the expectation derived from the Intergovernmental 
Perspective that the Member States would be able to stop or reverse measures that 
contradict their fundamental interests. This might be viewed as an indication on the EU 
level institutions ability to independently influence crisis decision making as further 
discussed in chapter five. 
4.2 Member State Response and New Control 
Mechanisms 
Based on the Intergovernmental Perspective it can be expected that the Member States 
would not chose to integrate in policy areas they view as having fundamental national 
importance. However, it can also be expected that the European Commission would not 
take policy initiatives that fundamentally go against the interests of the Member States. 
This means that evidence of Member State emergency brakes and control mechanisms 
should be found in the new EU level crisis management provision, which can be seen as 
an indication of the use of institutional design in the decision making process to 
accommodate the Member State Governments. The following discussion will begin by 
investigating the White Paper hearing responses from the Member States and then 
concentrate on the final arrangements for crisis situation decision making and 
institutional crisis response arrangements made by the 2002 Regulation. 
4.2.1 White Paper Hearing Responses 
The European Commission White Paper on Food Safety was intended to launch an EU 
wide debate on how the regulatory framework was to be developed (Alemanno 
2006:247). It contained structural regulative provisions, like risk analysis and the 
precautionary principle, as well as more concrete EU level crisis management measures, 
like extending the Rapid Alert System (European Commission 2000a: Art. 12, 14, 18). 
The European Commission welcomed suggestions from all involved parties and sent the 
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White Paper on hearing to all Member State Governments (Ibid. 3). A limited number of 
Member State responses to the White Paper have been made available by the EU. Even 
so, they can be used as an indication on the main response towards the proposed food 
crisis management provisions. 
The primary response found in the hearings was an overall acceptance of the proposed 
provisions relevant to crisis management with few additional Member State comments, 
indicating it did not challenge their fundamental national interests (Austrian Gov. 2000; 
British Gov. 2000; German Gov. 2000; Irish Gov. 2000). While enhancing the European 
Commission‟s opportunity to take initiatives, the Member States still underlined the 
importance of having their part of the crisis management responsibility fully recognised 
(Ibid.). An example can be derived from Ireland‟s response to the White Paper when 
stating that “Risk management (legislation and control) should be carried out by the 
Commission and the Member States” (Irish Gov. 2000:2). The German Federal 
Government‟s response reflected a similar view, emphasising the importance of good 
communication between the European Commission and the Member States, as the two 
parties responsible for food safety crisis management (German Gov. 2000). Also the 
British Government‟s response to the proposed crisis management provisions was 
primarily positive. They especially emphasised that “separate streams of communication 
from the Member States, the EFSA and the Commission could increase public anxiety 
and confusion” and asked for communication to be more extensively considered in the 
future regulation (British Gov. 2000: point 20). 
According to Moravcsik (1998:51) interstate negotiations can be seen as bargaining 
games over the terms of “mutually beneficial cooperation”.14 Furthermore, he outlines 
two dimensions of bargaining outcomes that are of particular interests: distribution of 
gains and efficiency. By carrying out cost-benefit analyses the Member States weight and 
review the different alternatives and chose the most Pareto-efficient outcome (Ibid.). As 
the Member States accepted the crisis management provisions proposed by the European 
                                              
14 Moravcsik (1998:51) focuses on interstate negotiations when outlining his second analytical level, the interstate 
bargaining level. Though, the Member State responses to the White Paper is not interstate bargaining, the same criteria for 
evaluating the costs and benefits of the proposed measures were important as its aim was to establish new EU level crisis 
management capacities. 
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Commission in the White Paper without major changes, the advantages of cooperation 
have overshadowed the disadvantages of delegating crisis planning and response 
capacities to the EU level. The food area has since the establishment of the CAP been a 
highly integrated policy area, while the question of the safety of food had mainly been 
left to the Member States. It is pertinent to expect that both of Moravcsik‟s bargaining 
dimensions have been important for the Member States‟ White Paper response: The 
proposed integrative measures would create more efficient crisis response capacities on 
an otherwise integrated policy area; and consequently the distribution of gains could be 
seen as relatively equal, as all Member States were dependent on having safe food 
distributed in the single market. 
As crisis management is argued to be important to national governments and a capacity 
build up on the EU level was proposed, the acceptance of the White Paper proposals can 
indicate that it did not challenge the basic interests of the Member States. However, to 
compensate for the reduction of crisis management authority by individual Member 
States, new control mechanisms and emergency brakes for the Member States can be 
expected to have been put in place in the final agreement, which may explain their 
overall acceptance of the White Paper proposals. The next two sections will investigate 
whether this argument is valid for the final crisis management measures established by 
the 2002 Regulation, and thereby move from Moravcsik‟s interstate bargaining level to 
his third analytical level, establishing credible commitments. 
4.2.2 Decision Making Procedures in Crisis Situations 
A major challenge in the crisis response phase is to make the right decisions in an 
environment characterised by lack of information (Rosenthal et. al. 2001:18). Therefore, 
who is involved in the crisis decision making process is of high importance as what they 
can bring to the table to solve the situation is decisive for good management. 
An important measure implemented with the 2002 Regulation was the reorganisation of 
the committee structure and the establishment of the Standing Committee on the Food 
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Chain and Animal Health15 (European Communities 2002: (62)). The Standing 
Committee is led by the European Commission and consists of representatives from the 
Member State Governments. It is to assist the European Commission in developing 
appropriate food safety measures and its mandate covers the entire food supply chain to 
enhance its ability to target risks to health wherever they arise in the production of food. 
Furthermore, measures on which the Standing Committee has delivered an opinion will 
be formally adopted by the European Commission (European Commission website1). In 
crisis situations the Standing Committee plays an important role in examining and giving 
an opinion on the emergency measures proposed by the European Commission, in 
particular measures involving suspension of the placing of specific food on the common 
agricultural market (European Commission 2004: Article 5.4). The opinion given by the 
Standing Committee by majority vote is to be viewed as binding for the European 
Commission choice of measures to deal with a given crisis situation (European Council 
1999: Art. 5). The Standing Committee can be seen as part of a complex spectrum of 
committees popularly referred to as comitology (Joerges 1999:3). They have been 
established to balance Member States‟ “(…) collective interest in deepening the internal 
market with their particular interests in economic and social protection” (Neyer 
1999:221). The system of committees allows competence to be moved to the EU level 
while at the same time letting the Member States keep a „hand on the wheel‟ in the 
decision making process (Joerges 1999:9). 
The Standing Committee is given the role as an important centre point for 
communication. It holds regular meetings throughout crisis situations to ensure that all 
relevant information is shared and to oversee Member States‟ implementation of the 
crisis management measures (European Commission 2004: Art. 5.4). The Standing 
Committee also plays an important role in creating a link between the new EU level crisis 
unit and the decision-making process, in particular by getting regular updates on the 
work of the crisis unit as well as having EFSA representatives attending their meetings. 
In the same way, the crisis unit shall be kept continuously informed about the measures 
                                              
15 The 2002 Regulation established one committee, the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health, with 
enhanced responsibilities for decision making in crisis situation, replacing the previous four committees holding 
overlapping responsibilities. See section 2.3. 
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taken as part of the decision-making process in order to coordinate their information 
(Ibid.). The institutions with access to whatever information is available get an important 
advantage in both the public debate on the appropriate response as well as in relations 
with other institutions involved in the crisis situation decision making process. With the 
Standing Committee‟s role in sharing information and responsibility for the contact with 
the EU-level crisis response institutions the Member States‟ representatives are 
strengthening their capacity in defining both the problems and solutions of the situation. 
The 2002 Regulation delegated responsibility to the EU level, while the system of 
committees let the Member States keep their direct participation in crisis situation 
decision making. The Member States retained control of the flow of information and the 
option to decline the European Commission‟s proposal in the Standing Committee. 
Decisions in the Standing Committee were to be made by majority vote which according 
to Moravcsik (1998:67) can be seen as pooling of sovereignty as governments agree to 
decide future matters by voting procedures other than unanimity. This is said to be a 
means for Member State Governments to assure that other governments will accept 
future legislation and signal their own credibility (Ibid. 73). However, as shown in 
chapter two and section 4.2 the Member States targeted by former EU crisis management 
measures have been strongly opposing them and argued that management of food crises 
was a fundamental national interest. Moravcsik argues that on his level of national 
preference formation it is domestic interests that make up the preferences advocated by 
national governments (Ibid. 24-27). The Member States‟ acceptance of the use of 
majority vote on a policy area argued to be of national importance therefore contradicts 
the expectations derived from the Intergovernmental Perspective. 
4.2.3 Crisis Response Measures 
One of the most characteristic features of crisis situations is the expectation of surprise. 
This means that there will always be a tension between the institutionalised tendency to 
routinise crisis management practices and procedures and the necessity to operate in a 
flexible and adaptive way in the event of a crisis situation (Rosenthal et al. 2001:17). The 
chosen institutional arrangements to respond to the crisis are therefore of high importance 
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for how successful the management of the crisis situation is. Based on the 
Intergovernmental Perspective, a high level of Member State control on the new EU 
crisis management response capacities can be expected. 
Even though the 2002 Regulation obliges Member States to adopt the measures decided 
on the EU level, Member States are still responsible for the main part of the first hand 
crisis response capacities (European Communities 2002: Art. 53.1). Crisis management 
involves a range of government officials, from police officers to health care workers, 
which are still under Member State command. By managing the executive crisis response 
organisations, Member States have a direct influence on how to carry out the measures 
decided at EU level. An example can be the Dioxin Chicken case in Belgium when the 
Belgian Government disagreed on the imposed EU measures and therefore postponed 
implementing them. The situation was resolved after enormous political pressure from 
the European Commission and other Member States forced the Belgian government to 
implement the measures (Jukes 1999; Lezaun and Groenleer 2006:443). As mentioned in 
section 4.2.2 the Standing Committee makes decisions in crisis situations by majority 
vote. This means that we might see Member States opposing crisis management measures 
that are directly affecting their own food markets. By intentionally slowing down the 
implementation, Member States targeted by the Standing Committee‟s crisis management 
measures can win time to manage the crisis in accordance with their own understanding 
of the situation. Viewed in the light of the Intergovernmental Perspective this gives the 
Member States an unofficial emergency brake. 
The 2002 Regulation established a network of crisis coordinators that consist of 
representatives from each Member State, EFSA and the European Commission. The 
crisis coordinators are meant to be standby and ready to be integrated into an active crisis 
unit responsible for gathering and evaluating all relevant data and identifying options 
available for managing the crisis (European Commission 2004: Art. 5.2). Also, it has the 
role of informing the public about the risks in question and is meant to be an additional 
tool for ensuring that crises are managed effectively by ensuring better coordination and 
that action is taken quickly (Ibid.). The crisis unit is an important source of input to the 
decision making conducted by the Standing Committee as well as an information sharing 
and coordinating body important for managing the crisis situation. 
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The 2002 Regulation allows Member States to take initial response initiatives in crisis 
situations. When the European Commission is not taking any initiatives to respond to a 
situation which one or more of the Member State Governments views as a crisis 
situation, unilateral interim protective measures can be adopted (European Communities 
2002: Art. 54.1-3). Within ten working days the European Commission is required to 
arrange a meeting with the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health to 
decide on the extension, amendment or abrogation of the national interim measures. 
Member States can maintain their national interim protective measures until European 
Community measures have been adopted (Ibid. Art. 54.3). The possibility to take initial 
crisis response initiatives supports the expectation derived from the Intergovernmental 
Perspective that Member States are to keep their crisis management control. 
Based on the Intergovernmental Perspective it can be expected that the supranational 
institutions‟ functions are severely curtailed in sensitive policy areas (Cini 2003:97). This 
can be argued to be true for food safety crisis management as Member States in past 
crisis situations strongly opposed EU involvement, creating tension in the decision 
making process. Member States‟ participation in the network of crisis coordinators and 
the crisis unit gives them an important role in both the crisis planning and response 
phases; through this they actively take part in cross border coordination procedures and 
have a first hand control of the EU level external information strategy. Also, the Member 
States‟ opportunity to take unilateral interim measures responding to food crises gives 
them freedom of action in working out the initial crisis response. However, contradicting 
the expectations derived from the Intergovernmental Perspective the 2002 Regulation 
gave the European Commission a similar ability to take initial crisis response initiatives. 
This moderates the significance of the Member States‟ unilateral interim measures 
(European Communities 2002: Art. 53.2). 
4.3 Conclusion: Member States’ Passive Acceptance and 
New Control Mechanisms 
By carrying out a cost-benefit analysis, where it is pertinent to expect that both 
distribution of gains and efficiency were important, the Member States approved the 
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crisis management proposals in the European Commission White Paper without major 
changes. A possible explanation is that the enhanced EU level crisis management 
capacities were accompanied by increased control mechanisms and emergency brakes for 
the Member States in both crisis situation decision making and crisis management 
measures in the 2002 Regulation. As a result of institutional design allowing Member 
States keep a „hand on the wheel‟ the new measures were made less controversial to the 
Member State Governments. 
An important backdrop for the EU integration of crisis management measures was the 
Member States‟ response to EU initiatives in former food crises. The Intergovernmental 
Perspective falls short when explaining why it has been possible for the European 
Commission to override Member States opposing crisis management measures. This was 
argued to conflict with fundamental national interests. Furthermore, this perspective fails 
to explain the use of majority vote in crisis decision making in the Standing Committee 
and the European Commission‟s opportunity to take interim crisis management measures 
in a highly sensitive area.  
The discussion above on the establishment of crisis management capacities within the 
framework of the 2002 Regulation does not rule out the relevance of the 
Intergovernmental Perspective. However, a second perspective focusing on the role of 
the EU level institutions and their relevance for the integration of food safety crisis 
management should be added. 
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5. The EU Level Institutions 
Historical Institutionalism‟s basic assumption is that „institutions matter‟ as shapers of 
and influence upon the behaviour of actors rather than mere expressions of political 
culture (Rosamond 2003:114). This perspective is applied to discuss the second 
hypothesis (Hypothesis B) of this thesis stating that the integration process of crisis 
management in the food safety area has been driven forward by EU level institutions like 
the European Commission and the European Parliament. Furthermore, this perspective 
outlines path dependency and crisis situations as important structural distinctions for 
institutional change. 
The first part of this chapter will investigate whether the process can be characterised by 
path dependency and whether crises occurring within the research time frame have 
influenced the policy reform process. The second part of this chapter will discuss the 
roles of the European Commission and the European Parliament. Focus will be on 
Historical Institutionalism‟s claim that institutions hold preferences for self preservation 
in acting as supranational leaders and in launching policy initiatives. 
5.1 Historical Paths and Altering Crises 
The second section of this chapter will focus on expectations derived from Historical 
Institutionalism on institutional behaviour and preference formation. This section‟s aim is 
to discuss the expectations of path dependency and the effect of external crises on the 
integration of food safety crisis management. Historical Institutionalism emphasises that 
choices made early in the history of any policy will determine subsequent decisions. This 
implies that once a policy is launched on a path it will remain on that path until 
significant forces diverts it (Thelen 1999:387; Peters 2005:19). Sudden external changes 
or crisis situations can cause radical and swift transformations allowing a new 
institutional regime to arise (Olsen 1992:16). The following sections investigate if these 
expectations can be applied to the EU integration process in focus. I start by exploring 
evidence of path dependency, before looking closer at the effects of crisis situations 
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where I first discuss implication of the 1996 peak of the BSE Crisis. The 1999 Dioxin 
Chicken Crisis in Belgium is also discussed. 
5.1.1 Path Dependency 
It is evident that guiding principles initiated as a response to the BSE Crisis dominated 
the debate leading up to the 2002 Regulation. The Santer Commission‟s initial response 
to the BSE Crisis was that there had been a mismatch in the relative attention given to 
market issues and health issues and that more should have been done in the prevention 
phase (Santer 1997: Point 3). To remedy the deficiency within the agricultural sector the 
Commission decided that three new principles were to guide the work of departments 
dealing with human health: excellence, independence and transparency (Ibid. Point 9). 
This created a new primary framework with new prioritisations for how to organise the 
food safety area. The principles also became guiding principles for the discussion on how 
to reform the crisis response capacities. The new principles can be traced in policy 
documents throughout the research time frame, as well as in the 2002 Regulation 
(European Commission 1997b; 2000a; European Communities 2002: Art. 37-39). For 
example, by the division of advisory and executive powers and the focus on creating 
solid structures for information sharing in crisis situations, the 2002 Regulation correlates 
with the principles established in 1997 (European Communities 2002: Art. 22, 56, 57). 
Going further back in time, before the BSE Crisis, the historical backdrop becomes 
relevant by focusing on the policy constrains created by previous decision making. From 
the early 1960s until the early 1990s there was no unifying text defining the 
responsibilities of the parties involved in the food safety area (Alemanno 2006:243). 
Food law was mainly focused on trade issues and the free movement of goods rather than 
safety issues. No explicit reference was made to public health or consumer protection in 
the Treaty of Rome until the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986 and the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (Ibid. 239; European Communities 1987: Art. 25; Maastricht 
1992: Art. 129a). Even though there were several attempts to turn the European 
Economic Community‟s food policy towards the achievement of new goals, such as the 
protection of public health and the consumers, these aspects of European food law were 
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mainly neglected and “implemented in a way functional to the economic requirements of 
the internal market” (Alemanno 2006:243). In this way the existing and dominating food 
legislative framework aiming at creating an internal market overshadowed other 
priorities within food legislation. The initial decisions taken when establishing European 
food law constrained its future expansion from including consumer safety measures and 
the possibility to create closer cooperation in food safety crisis management. 
In the 1980s the work to establish a single market for trade within the European system 
escalated, especially by the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986. In 1993 the 
single market became a reality. This meant a further integration of the agricultural policy 
area opening up for an increased trade in food and feed across European borders 
(Veggeland 2001:16). As EU-level food safety crisis response capacities were highly 
limited, the creation of the common European market made it possible for the food crises 
of the 1990s to spread fast between the Member States. Though Britain was the country 
hardest hit by the BSE Crisis, its beef and cattle were sold across Europe (Grönvall 
2001:160). In the case of the Dioxin Chicken Crisis it was widespread fears that the 
poisoned feed had been sold also outside Belgium (Lezaun and Groenleer 2006:441). 
This makes the policy development before the 1996 BSE Crisis an important prerequisite 
for the crises‟ Europe wide impact. 
It is evident that the new guiding principles implemented in response to the BSE Crisis 
created the basis for the discussion on food safety that ensued, and for the 2002 
Regulation. However, going further back in time the extensive focus on free trade 
overshadowing European integration of food safety crisis management capacities can be 
traced back to the 1960s and the establishment of the CAP. It has been an important 
condition for why the effects of the food crises in the 1990s became so widespread. This 
is in compliance with Historical Institutionalism‟s path dependency, making policy 
decisions made at an earlier point in time important to understand later policy outcomes 
and institutional arrangements. In the next section the effects of food crises are 
investigated as external forces instigating change for food safety crisis management. 
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5.1.2 Crises That Bring About Change 
Even though Historical Institutionalism emphasise path dependency, sudden changes in 
the surroundings or crisis situations are seen as factors that can lead to institutional 
reforms (Olsen 1992:16; March and Olsen 1989). This is especially the case when 
institutions are not prepared and are unable to respond efficiently. For managers the main 
challenge in the crisis aftermath phase is to use it as a „window of opportunity‟ to create 
positive change and prevent that it evolves into a new urgent crisis situation (Rosenthal et 
al. 2001:20). Within the research time frame two important crises occurred: First, the 
1996 peak of the BSE Crisis centred in the United Kingdom, and second, the 1999 
Dioxin Chicken Crisis in Belgium combined with the growing anxiety towards 
genetically modified food (Lezaun and Groenleer 2006:439-443). 
The BSE Crisis was the biggest food crisis that had ever hit the European food market. 
Its extensive consequences for the food industry, national governments and most 
importantly the citizens of the EU, made headlines throughout the world. (Grönvall 
2001:159-160). It represented a rapid change in the prerequisite for crisis managers 
dealing with food safety. The events in the aftermath of the BSE Crisis illustrate that 
institutions, although embedded in historical traditions, are not unchangeable. 
According to Olsen (1992:16) the more inefficient and the less prepared institutions are 
the more likely is it that the current institutional arrangements will collapse and let a new 
regime arise. The BSE Crisis directed public focus and prompted serious criticism on the 
way European food regulation and crisis management was organised. Especially the 
cooperation within the EU, relations between expert advisors and policy-makers and 
between food control institutions and central government were questioned (Hellebø 
2004:25). The weak and seemingly chaotic crisis response to the BSE Crisis, created a 
public debate that launched a rethinking of the European response capacity in food safety 
crisis situations (European Parliament 1997). Also, there was a general agreement in the 
aftermath of the BSE Crisis between both representatives of the Member State 
Governments and the European Commission that there was a need for reforming the food 
safety area to strengthen crisis response capacities and prevent similar situations in the 
future. The Communication on Consumer Health and Commission Green Paper on Food 
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Law were direct EU level responses to the BSE Crisis (European Commission 1997a; 
1997b). Several proposals first presented in these documents, like establishing an 
independent European food agency and expanding the European Commissions initial 
crisis response measures, were later reflected in the 2002 Regulation that reformed the 
European approach to crisis management. This makes the BSE Crisis an important 
prerequisite for the 2002 Regulation. 
In 1999 the Dioxin Chicken Crisis in Belgium, fuelled by the aftermath of the BSE Crisis 
and the growing consumer concern about the safety of genetically modified food, created 
a new wave of public scrutiny towards European food safety (Alemanno 2006:246). 
Attention was directed towards the lack of a common European response and the 
European Commission‟s ability to get its proposed measures implemented on the 
national level (Lezaun and Groenleer 2006:441). Together with the report on the future 
of scientific advice (James et. al. 1999) published in December 1999, this created a 
foundation for the White Paper on Food Safety to reach the top of the European agenda 
when published later the same year (Alemanno 2006:246; European Commission 2000a). 
This new public and political focus on the shortcomings of the existing European crisis 
response capacities were important factors speeding up the reform process and made it 
easier for the European Commission to present radical proposals for change. 
Both the 1996 BSE Crisis and the 1999 Dioxin Chicken Crisis can be argued to be 
important, not only in creating headlines, but also by breaking ground for new reform 
proposals in line with Thelen‟s (1999) „institutional dynamism‟. The crises affecting the 
food safety area created abrupt changes in the foundation of the European food policy 
regime, removing existing institutional arrangements and establishing external legitimacy 
for new initiatives. Taking new policy initiatives and proposing legislation the European 
Parliament and the European Commission can be argued to exemplify the use of the 
initial aftermath of both the BSE Crisis and the Dioxin Chicken Crisis as „windows of 
opportunities‟. This argument is further strengthened when viewed in the light of the 
discussion below that underlines EU-level institutions‟ importance in redefining who the 
emergency constitutes a crisis for (see section 5.2.1). Even so, new solutions and 
principles for how to manage crisis situations were not created without reference to 
previous arrangements and policy decisions, as shown above in Section 5.1.1. 
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5.2 Taking Initiatives and Steering the Integration Process 
This section will discuss the roles of the European Commission and the European 
Parliament. Three empirical approaches will be applied: first, the EU level institutions‟ 
definitions of crises; second, policy initiatives taken by the institutions throughout the 
research time frame; and third, a closer look at the final institutional arrangements made 
in the 2002 Regulation. 
5.2.1 Defining a Crisis for Europe 
In chapter one a crisis was defined in terms of an “urgent threat to the core values of a 
polity” (Boin et al. 2006a:2). Traditionally the polity, the social system, has been 
understood as the EU Member States, since they were in charge of managing food crises. 
However, for the EU to be the right governance level to manage the emergency, the crisis 
situation should be defined as “an urgent threat to the systems that serve the basic 
functions of the European Union”, rather than the individual Member States (Ibid. 20). 
This makes it possible for actors involved to redefine who hold the responsibility for food 
crises occurring within the EU borders. Based on the expectation that the EU institutions 
are self interest oriented, it is likely that the European Parliament and the European 
Commission would advocate defining crises situations as European. 
Even though the outbreak of BSE started long before 1996, it was not before the British 
government announced the possible connection between the cattle disease and its human 
affliction that it was perceived or acknowledged as a European crisis (Grönvall 
2001:156). Several arguments were important: First, it could be perceived as a result of 
failed EU food policy. Second, it constituted a possible threat to the public health of EU 
citizens in several Member States. Third, it negatively affected the economic co-
operation between Member States in the internal market. In the case of the Dioxin 
Chicken Crisis the same arguments were important; it posed a threat to the health of EU 
citizens and disrupted the common European food marked (Boin et al. 2006a:43). 
These arguments were advocated by both the European Commission and the European 
Parliament in the crisis aftermaths (European Commission 1997b; European Parliament 
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1997; Lezaun and Groenleer 2006:441-43; Santer 1997). An example can be derived 
from the comment by European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services Frits 
Bolkestein (2000:2) that “[in] recent years Europe has faced two major food crises - 
BSE and Dioxin - which have had a tremendous impact on European public opinion”. 
Another example is the European Parliament (1997) investigation into the BSE Crisis 
and how responsibility was divided between the two governance levels: “Responsibility 
for the problem is divided between the authorities concerned with agriculture and animal 
health and those concerned with public health protection. This applies to both EU and 
national level (…)”. As EU-level institutions have given food safety crisis situations the 
EU and European adjectives, they have indirectly been active in legitimising increased 
EU involvement and their own participation in food crisis management. This supports the 
expectation derived from Historical Institutionalism about EU-level institutions holding 
preferences for self preservation, consequently advocating new EU-level initiatives. 
5.2.2 Integrative Initiatives 
Based on Historical Institutionalism it can be expected that institutional identity 
influences decision makers‟ preferences and the EU institutions to favour integrative 
measures. In this section the European institutions in focus will be discussed, and their 
influence within the research time frame assessed. The discussion is divided into two 
time periods: first, the initial response to the BSE Crisis; and second, the immediate 2002 
Regulation preface. 
Initial Response to the BSE Crisis  
According to Skogstad (2001:498) the European Parliament took an active leadership 
role in food safety regulatory reforms and worked closely with consumer interest 
organisations in the early aftermath of the BSE Crisis. This is also noted by the 
Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection, David Byrne (2000), who stated that 
the “Parliament played a crucial role in Europe‟s response to the BSE Crisis (...)”. Most 
importantly it launched a Committee for a public inquiry into the European 
Commission‟s role throughout the crisis situation. The Committee‟s report was published 
in February 1997 and criticised the European Commission for neglecting its duties, 
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especially by failing to fulfil its role in initiating legislation (European Parliament 1997). 
Furthermore, the Committee posed 75 questions which the European Parliament required 
the European Commission to answer in order to avoid a no-confidence vote that could 
force its resignation (Skogstad 2001:498). 
The European Commission‟s response to the Committee warded off the no-confidence 
vote and suggested extending the use of co-decision16 to the food safety area, confirmed 
in the Amsterdam Treaty later the same year (Ibid.; Santer 1997). The co-decision 
procedure makes the European Parliament a joint decision maker with the Council. The 
European Commission also responded to the European Parliament criticism by proposing 
new basic regulatory principles important for food safety crisis management. Especially 
important was risk analysis related principles like: separating legislation from scientific 
consultation; separate responsibility for legislation and for inspection; and greater 
transparency throughout the decision making process (Santer 1997). These were reflected 
in the Green Paper on food law published later the same year, aimed at creating a debate 
on the future of the EU food safety regulatory framework including its crisis management 
provisions (European Commission 1997b). 
Important in both the European Commission President Jacques Santer‟s speech to the 
European Parliament after the BSE Crisis and the Green Paper was that food safety was 
given a renewed role and prioritised as an even more important factor to take into 
consideration than the principle of free trade in the food market (Alemanno 2006:244; 
European Commission 1997b; Santer 1997). This was also reflected in the 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty with the EU Member States fully acknowledging public health and 
consumer protection as objectives of the European integration process (Amsterdam 1997: 
Art. 3(29)). In fact the Member States embraced all the European Commission Green 
Paper suggestions, except deciding on the establishment of a European food agency. 
                                              
16 Co-decision has been in use since the Treaty of Maastricht. Proposals are sent from the European Commission to the 
Council and European Parliament which are given three rounds of readings. If the parties disagree in the second reading, 
the European Parliament can reject the proposal by an absolute majority. The European Parliament may amend the 
Council‟s common position by an absolute majority, in which case conciliation takes place between the parties. The final 
proposal must be approved in the third round of reading by the Council (by QMV) and the European Parliament (by 
majority vote) (Europa website 2007; Wallace 2000:22). 
 67 
Both the European Parliament and the European Commission can be argued to have been 
central in creating institutional change in the early aftermath of the 1996 BSE Crisis, 
especially in the preparations for the intergovernmental conference in Amsterdam. The 
European Parliament took a leading role as a strong ally of consumer interest groups in 
creating debate and putting pressure on the European Commission. An important 
consequence of the European Parliament‟s active participation in the BSE Crisis 
management evaluation was the introduction of the co-decision procedure. This increased 
its policy regulatory influence, supporting the expectation derived from Historical 
Institutionalism that the EU institutions would advocate increased EU involvement. The 
European Commission initiated policy reforms and presented them to both the Member 
States and the wider public as a response to the heavy criticism in the BSE Crisis 
aftermath. By taking crisis management policy initiatives in the BSE aftermath, both the 
European Commission and the European Parliament appears as supranational leaders in 
the food safety area, in line with Historical Institutionalism. This gives the EU 
institutions in focus important roles in the early aftermath of the BSE Crisis and the 
establishment of underlying organisational principles for how crisis management 
measures in the 2002 Regulation on food safety were to be designed and implemented. 
2002 Regulation Preface 
While the European Parliament gained a legislative role, the European Commission was 
the institution responsible for taking initiatives. It was the European Commission that 
gave the task of making a preparatory report on reforming the system of scientific advice 
to three scientists, Philip James, Fritz Kemper and Gerard Pascal (James et al. 1999:2). 
By taking this initiative, and with the White Paper on Food Safety the year after, they re-
launched the debate on reforming the food safety area including crisis management 
measures (Alemanno 2006:246). Because of the extensive influence from scientific 
interests in the food safety area, it is pertinent to presume that by basing the proposals in 
the White Paper on scientific advice, the European Commission was strengthening its 
reform proposals when facing integration reform scepticism. 
The European Commission‟s responsibility for initiating and formulating new politics, in 
the form of legislative, budgetary or programme proposals placed it in a key position in 
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the preparation of the 2002 Regulation. Important in this process was the European 
Commission White Paper that proposed to combine a reform on the food regulatory 
framework with an institutional reform (Ibid. 246; European Commission 2000a). The 
White Paper reflected several of the European Commission‟s main proposals as they 
were outlined in the 1997 Green Paper. The final version of the 2002 Regulation reflects 
the main measures important for crisis management that was presented in the White 
Paper (Allemanno 2006:248; European Commission 1997b; 2000a). First, this can be 
viewed as an indication of a common understanding between the involved parties, the 
European Commission, the European Parliament and the Member States, of what the 
means to solve the problems were. Second, and more importantly it can be viewed as an 
indication of the European Commission‟s leadership in the food safety regulatory policy 
debate. By re-launching the same reform proposals at different stages in the decision 
making process they can be understood to have become less controversial as time went 
by. An example is the establishment of the EFSA, important for providing decision 
makers with independent research in crisis situations, which was proposed by the 
European Commission in the 1997 Green Paper, but at the time dismissed by the Member 
States in the Amsterdam Treaty (European Commission 1997b; Amsterdam 1997). When 
re-launched in the 2000 White Paper it gained wider support and was finally established 
with the 2002 Regulation (European Commission 2000a; European Communities 2002). 
By implementing the co-decision procedure in the food safety area, the making of food 
law was made into joint acts of the European Parliament and the Council and added an 
irrevocable EU parliamentary veto to previous arrangements (Skogstad 2001:498; 
Wallace 2000:22). To fulfil the requirement of having an identical final text adopted by 
both the European Parliament and the Council, the White Paper had to go through two 
rounds of readings (European Parliament 2001a). In total the European Parliament 
suggested more than 200 amendments, with about half immediately accepted fully or in 
principle by the European Commission (European Commission 2001). 
Though the proposals in the White Paper were adopted in the 2002 Regulation without 
major or fundamental changes, the European Parliament‟s amendments supported an 
increase in EU level crisis management measures (European Parliament 2001a). First, the 
Rapid Alert System was requested to be given an extended role “to cover all areas of 
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food safety, including animal feed” (European Parliament 2000: point 17). It was also 
decided that it would continue to operate under the European Commission and not be 
moved to the EFSA as originally proposed (Ibid. point 16; European Commission 2001). 
This places the extended Rapid Alert System under the direct influence and control of the 
European Commission. Second, the precautionary principle was stressed as a 
fundamental and guiding rule when addressing food emergencies (European Parliament 
2000: point 19). As the EU-level response capacities were strengthened with the 2002 
Regulation, the precautionary principle further enhanced the European Commission‟s 
ability to launch initial response initiatives. Third, the European Parliament embraced the 
establishment of EFSA as the main scientific body to support the European Commission 
and Member States‟ emergency response, enhancing the EU level‟s scientific basis for 
decision making in crisis situations (Ibid. point 19; EU Food Law News 2000).  
An additional aspect, underlining the general importance of the European Parliament for 
the 2002 Regulation is its emphasis on considering consumer interests in the decision 
making process. In the food safety area the European Parliament has been an important 
advocate of consumer interests, working closely with consumer organisations (Skogstad 
2001:498). As proposed in European Parliament‟s response to the White Paper and 
reflected in the 2002 Regulation, one of EFSA‟s central tasks were to promote the 
networking of consumer organisations. Also, four members of the EFSA‟s board were to 
have backgrounds in consumer and industry matters (European Parliament 2001a; 2001b: 
Amendment 66). It is pertinent to view this as an indication of the European Parliament‟s 
influence in the 2002 Regulation. 
Both the European Parliament and the European Commission played important roles in 
the 2002 Regulation preface. After the introduction of the co-decision procedure in the 
food safety area the European Parliament became part of a bicameral legislative system 
together with the Council and increased its decision making influence. Also, in response 
to the White Paper it came up with several initiatives reflected in the 2002 Regulation, 
enhancing EU level crisis response capacity in line with the expectations of Historical 
Institutionalism. By taking policy initiatives and re-launching reform measures 
throughout the process, the European Commission acted as a supranational leader and 
promoted increased EU-level crisis management capacity. 
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5.2.3 Final Institutional Arrangements 
Based on Historical Institutionalism it can be expected that EU-level institutions are the 
central actors in the European integration process. The ongoing nature of institutional 
interests, with preference for self-preservation, has led the EU institutions to embrace 
new EU management capacities (Rosamond 2003:116). If this is true for food safety 
crisis management the final arrangements in the 2002 Regulation should reflect the ideas 
and preferences of these institutions. As outlined in the second chapter, the 2002 
Regulation meant a move of crisis management capacity from the national level to the 
European level. Especially important were the establishment of the independent EFSA, 
the extension of the Rapid Alert System, the European Commission‟s increased authority 
to implement emergency measures, the establishment of new European level decision 
making procedures and information sharing mechanisms. In addition, two provisions 
made by the 2002 Regulation should be further elaborated. 
First, The Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health, responsible for 
decision making in crisis situations, make decisions by majority vote (European Council 
1999: Article 5). This can be argued to be a limitation on the influence of the Member 
States and especially those directly affected by the crisis, which in former crises have 
opposed EU involvement.17 The European Commission gets a stronger role and obtains a 
greater flexibility when proposing initiatives. This can be seen as a built-in mechanism 
that weakens the influence of the Member States and strengthens a common EU-level 
response. 
Second, the 2002 Regulation established a new mechanism for the European Commission 
to adopt measures provisionally, after consulting the Member State(s) concerned and 
informing the other Member States (European Communities 2002: Art. 53.2). The 
argument used for establishing this arrangement is that in crisis situations decisions have 
to be made fast, and in some cases there is not enough time to go through the full 
                                              
17 As shown in section 2.2 and section 4.1.1 this was the case in the BSE Crisis, when the British government strongly 
opposed EU crisis response measures and in the Dioxin Chicken Crisis when the Belgian government opposed EU crisis 
response measures and postponed implementation (Grönvall 2001:164; Lezaun and Groenleer 2006:439-443). 
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consultation process with all Member States. Measures adopted in this manner have to be 
confirmed, amended, revoked or extended by the Standing Committee within ten 
working days (Ibid.). Allowing the European Commission to adopt measures without 
having them formally confirmed by the Member States increases EU-level influence in 
the in the initial crisis response phase and its ability to take management initiatives. 
In previous crisis situations like the BSE Crisis the European Commission has been an 
advocate of a common European response (Grönvall 2001:162). Consequently, it could 
be expected that the European Commission will take the initiative to use the possibility of 
implementing interim protective measures if they deem it necessary. As this is in line 
with the European Commission‟s previous actions taken in food crises, this can be argued 
to indicate an active involvement promoting self interest, supporting the expectations 
derived from Historical Institutionalism. With the Member States on one side and the 
European Commission on the other, there is a parallelism in who is allowed to implement 
interim protective measures, moderating the role of both levels. However, both the 
majority vote decision making in the Standing Committee and the European 
Commission‟s prospective role in taking interim measures can be argued to be 
indications of the self-preserving mechanisms infused in the European Commission, as 
described by Historical Institutionalism (Rosamond 2003:116). 
5.3 Conclusion: Supranational Leadership, Crises 
Resulting in Change and Path Dependency 
Both the European Parliament and the European Commission played decisive roles for 
the integration of food safety crisis management by acting as supranational leaders and 
advocating increased EU level planning and response capacities. This was done by giving 
food crises the European adjective, consequently redefining the polity responsible for 
crisis management and promoting regulatory reform initiatives moving the policy area 
towards the EU level. This is also reflected in the 2002 Regulation where the European 
Commission enhanced its influence in the crisis response phase. 
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Within the research time frame a tendency of path dependency can be argued to be 
present, with the initial response to the BSE Crisis establishing organisational principles 
used in the 2002 Regulation. However, these new solutions and principles for how to 
manage crisis situations were not created without reference to previous arrangements. 
Food crises have also been important by creating windows of opportunities opening up 
for the EU institutions‟ policy initiatives. Both the 1996 BSE Crisis and the 1999 Dioxin 
Chicken Crisis caused enormous attention towards the failures of European food safety 
crisis management. 
The expectations derived from Intergovernmentalism and Historical Institutionalism have 
focused on action and decision making within a European context. However, EU food 
safety crisis management has not developed in isolation, and is part of a wider pattern of 
making policy beyond the nation state (Wallace 2000:7). The next chapter will therefore 
investigate the effect of ideas in the institutional environment. 
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6. The Institutional Environment 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the influence of ideas originating in the institutional 
environment on the EU integration of food safety crisis management. Especially 
important is the 1995 World Trade Organization (WTO) Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
(SPS) Agreement and the food regulatory standard setting Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, created by the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and the World 
Health Organisation (WHO). As explained below, the European Commission can be 
argued to be both an internal and external actor in the development of food standards and 
will be the EU institution in focus in this chapter. The following discussion is based on 
the Environment-Based Perspective as outlined in chapter three. A main expectation 
derived from this perspective is that food safety crisis management institutional 
arrangements have been adapted to the ideas in the institutional environment causing 
integration of crisis management in the food safety area. By discussing the integration of 
food crisis management as an outcome of the spread of ideas, instead of action and 
decision making, a second analytical level is added to this thesis. 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. First, it outlines the main institutions 
responsible for international food safety regulations and how the European Commission 
holds an external and internal position in developing new food safety regulations. 
Second, it discusses the similarities in ideas between the EU food safety crisis 
management and its institutional environment, emphasising imitation and external 
pressure to explain the process. 
6.1 The Environment 
The 1995 SPS Agreement negotiated during the Uruguay Round of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had a twofold objective. First, it was intended 
to minimise the negative effects of SPS measures on trade and sets out the basic rules in 
the WTO. Second, let Member States provide the level of health protection they deem 
appropriate (Skogstad 2001:492). By this the SPS Agreement let its signatories set their 
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own food safety standards as long as they are based on science, “applied only to the 
extent necessary to protect health”, and do not “arbitrarily or unjustifiable discriminate 
between countries where identical or similar conditions prevail” (WTO 1995:Article 3; 
WTO website1). To achieve its objective the SPS Agreement encourages international 
harmonisation of food standards and cites the Codex guidelines, recommendations and 
standards “as the preferred international measures for facilitating international trade in 
food” (WTO website2). 
The Codex Alimentarius Commission was established by the FAO and the WHO in 1963 
(Codex Alimentarius 2002). It was created to develop food standards and guidelines 
under the Joint FAO and WHO Food Standards Programme. The Codex Alimentarius 
Commission consists of representatives from its Member States who work to ensure that 
its standards withstand “the most rigorous scientific scrutiny” (WTO website2). It is an 
intergovernmental institution which base most of its work on advice from independent 
experts. The work of the Codex Alimentarius Commission has provided a focal point for 
scientific research on food and it has become an important international medium for the 
exchange of scientific information about food safety (Ibid.). The standards set by the 
Codex Alimentarius are not directly binding on its Members. However, strong incentives 
to adopt the standards were created when the 1995 SPS Agreement referred to them as 
the preferred international standards, creating a sense that they are quasi prescriptive 
(WTO 1995: Art. 12:3, Annex A: 3a). 
6.1.1 The European Commission’s External Role 
The European Commission has the sole treaty authority to negotiate international trade 
agreements on behalf of the European Communities, while it is the Council of Ministers 
that confers the negotiating mandate and the Member States that subsequently ratify any 
negotiated treaty (Skogstad 2001:486; Smith 2003:230-231). The European Commission 
represented the European Community throughout the Uruguay round, and was therefore 
responsible for negotiating the SPS Agreement. The European Commission has also been 
representing EU Member States and the European Community in the SPS Committee, 
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exposing officials on a regular basis to the WTO level food safety arrangements (WTO 
website7). 
The Codex standards which are referred to in the SPS Agreement as the guiding 
principles for international food safety harmonisation were created by the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (WTO 1995: Art. 3, Codex Alimentarius 2006:13). 
Furthermore, the Codex system consists of Codex Committees and Coordinating 
Committees responsible for preparing draft standards and developing regional standards. 
In the 1990s the European Commission represented the European Community as a full 
Member of the FAO and held observer status in the Codex, along with the EU Member 
States18 (Food Standards Agency 2002). This places the European Commission in a 
central position in the development of new international food safety standards and 
establishes a strong internal – external link in the work on reforming EU food policy. 
6.2 Isomorphism and Institutional Change 
6.2.1 Similar Ideas 
In the first half of the 1990s food safety received increased international attention. This 
was caused by a large growth in the international trade of food, while the European 
Community at the same time established the single market leading to the harmonisation 
of the Member States‟ food law (Veggeland 2001:16). Central in the international debate 
on food safety was the WTO SPS Agreement and the UN based Codex Alimentarius 
Commission. Within this context a new framework of organisational ideas such as risk 
analysis and the precautionary principle developed (see Millstone and Zwanenberg 2002; 
Veggeland 2001; 2002; Veggeland and Borgen 2005). 
                                              
18 As a full Member of the FAO the European Community represented by the European Commission was also entitled to 
full membership in the Codex Alimentarius Commission. In 1994 the Council authorised the Commission to enter into 
negotiations with the Codex Alimentarius Commission with the goal of defining the conditions and procedures for the 
Community‟s accession. However, the discussions were blocked by EU Member States‟ concerns about internal 
coordination and the division of responsibilities. In 2003 the European Community became a Member of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (Europa website 2003b; European Council 2003). 
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Based on the Environment Perspective it can be expected that EU measures on food 
safety crisis management made by the 2002 Regulation reflects ideas in the institutional 
environment. There are no direct references made to crisis management in the SPS 
Agreement. However, several general organisational principles have implications for 
how crisis management measures are developed. The 2002 Regulation on food safety can 
be argued to reflect important ideas from both the SPS Agreement and the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission. First, there were similarities in the way in which the EU and 
WTO argued the necessity of reforms in the food safety area. Growing global and 
European food markets made it necessary to make clear rules and coordinative bodies to 
stop the spread of threats to the public‟s health (WTO 1998a). The WTO and EU food 
safety regulatory policy framework shared the policy goals of ensuring that food safety 
regulations do not restrict trade unfairly (Skogstad 2001:492; WTO 1998a). 
Consequently, a common framework was important in order to ensure that crisis 
management measures were not used to create unjustifiable trade barriers. This argument 
is shown in the following quote from the introduction to the SPS Agreement: 
“[Members desire] the establishment of a multilateral framework of rules and 
disciplines to guide the development, adoption and enforcement of sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures in order to minimize their negative effects on trade” (WTO 
1995:2). 
Also, in the introduction to the 2002 Regulation the link between common EU food 
safety measures and trade is evident: 
“(…) the free movement of food and feed within the Community can be achieved only 
if food and feed safety requirements do not differ significantly from Member State to 
Member State (…)” (European Communities 2002). 
Second, an important underlying principle to achieve fair trade of food is to base SPS 
measures on scientific evidence and risk assessment19 to demonstrate that they are 
necessary to protect health (Santer 1997; WTO 1998a; 1998b:3(i); 1999:3(i), (ii)). This 
can be seen in the following quote from the SPS Agreement: 
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“Members shall ensure that their SPS measures are based on an assessment, as 
appropriate to the circumstances, of the risk to human, animal or plant life or health, 
taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international 
organisations” (WTO 1995). 
The principle of risk assessment as an underlying principle for food safety was 
introduced by the President of the European Commission Jacques Santer in his 1997 
speech to the European Parliament in response to the BSE Crisis (Santer 1997). The 2002 
Regulation also reflects this approach: 
“In order for there to be confidence in the scientific basis for food law, risk assessments 
should be undertaken in an independent, objective and transparent manner, on the basis 
of the available scientific information and data” (European Communities 2002:(17)). 
While the SPS Agreement clearly states the need for risk assessment, it does not include 
other sides of risk analysis, like risk management and risk communication. However, risk 
assessment is recognised to be part of a wider process (WTO website4). The Codex 
Alimentarius Commission targets questions of risk management specifically and has 
created principles for application by Member State Governments (Codex Alimentarius 
2007:3). Combining Codex principles and the SPS Agreement creates a distinction 
between the role of scientists and the role of politicians (Skogstad 2001:496). Risk 
assessment is exclusively the role of scientists, while politicians are in charge of 
managing the risk identified by scientists. According to Echols (1998:541) this was done 
to protect the objectivity of science and to counter the subjectivity of culturally based 
food safety measures. The separation between risk management and risk assessment as a 
guiding principle was advocated by Jacques Santer when addressing the European 
Parliament in 1997. It was then presented as a new underlying principle that was to 
pervade all aspects of food safety, including crisis management (Santer 1997). This 
principle was also reflected in the 2002 Regulation: 
“Where food law is aimed at the reduction, elimination or avoidance of a risk to 
health, the three interconnected components of risk analysis – risk assessment, risk 
                                                                                                                                           
19 See section 2.3 for the full definitions of risk analysis. 
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management and risk communication – provide a systematic methodology for the 
determination of effective, proportionate and targeted measures or other actions to 
protect health” (European Communities 2002:(17)). 
Third, an important basic rule, especially for the planning and response phase of crisis 
management, is the possibility to implement precautionary measures in crisis situations. 
The precautionary approach is reflected in the SPS Agreement (WTO 1995) by Article 
5.7 that allows Members to “take provisional measures when sufficient scientific 
evidence does not exist to permit a final decision on the safety of a product or process” 
(WTO website5). Also Article 3.3, which explicitly permits Members to adopt SPS 
measures which are more stringent than measures based on the relevant international 
standard, is relevant (Ibid.). This gives the European Community as a signatory of the 
SPS Agreement the possibility to take early initiatives when facing eminent food crises. 
This is especially important in crisis situations where an early response is crucial for 
successful management.  But even in these cases the independence of decision makers 
and scientist are fundamental principles, interlinking the precautionary principle with risk 
analysis. In the 2002 Regulation the precautionary principle is used as an argument for 
integrating food safety measures on the EU level: 
 “The precautionary principle has been invoked to ensure health protection in the 
Community, thereby giving rise to barriers to the free movement of food or feed. 
Therefore it is necessary to adopt a uniform basis throughout the Community for the 
use of this principle” (European Communities 2002:(20)). 
Accordingly, there can be argued to be important similarities in the institutional ideas 
influencing food safety crisis management in the WTO, the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission and the EU. The European Commission held two roles, externally 
negotiating the SPS Agreement and observing the work of the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission and internally proposing new legislation. This makes it pertinent to argue 
that a common understanding of what rhetoric and institutional arrangements are 
„appropriate‟ for the food safety area has developed. This is referred to as isomorphism 
by the Environment Perspective. 
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According to Meyer and Rowan (1991:50) external legitimacy is achieved by reflecting 
societal values rather than adhering to technical demands. To achieve the external 
legitimacy needed to go through with regulatory reforms, a consideration of public 
concerns is essential. By reasoning integrative reform proposals as preventive towards 
possible new threats to the safety of food, both the EU and WTO answer to the public 
concerns in the aftermath of several major food crises throughout the 1990s.20 
Furthermore, to use rhetoric that sees the integration of food safety crisis management as 
a mean to achieve fair trade might have been important in appeasing interest parties 
within the food sector that were traditionally more reluctant towards integrative 
measures. Even so, the EU‟s interlinked relationship with the WTO SPS Agreement and 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission demands a further investigation of the EU‟s 
adoption of ideas and rhetoric from its environment. Has there been external pressure 
and/or has the European Commission imitated the WTO and Codex Alimentarius 
measures relevant for food safety crisis management? 
6.2.2 Imitation and/or External Pressure 
As described in chapter three DiMaggio and Powell (1991:67-70) outline two distinct 
processes in which organisations might adopt ideas from its environment, relevant for 
this study; imitation and external pressure. 
Imitation 
According to Skogstad (2001:498) EU reforms in the food safety area have been 
designed to fit the WTO model even when internal developments have been the primary 
driving force behind the policy innovations. The Codex Alimentarius Commission is an 
international focal point for scientific research and investigation into food safety as well 
as an important international arena for the exchange of scientific information (WTO 
website2). The European Commission has with its observatory status in the Codex 
                                              
20 In addition to the European food safety crisis other parts of the world faced similar threats in the 1990s. In Southern Asia 
and in Sub-Saharan Africa, food born diseases was a major threat to not only the health of its citizens, but also a major 
obstruction to development. In North America and developed Asian countries food safety was considered to be high, but 
still with the challenges of returning food borne illnesses (Safe Food International website). 
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Alimentarius Commission been exposed to these discussions and follow the evolution of 
the Codex‟ food standards and guidelines closely (Europa website 2003b). Consequently, 
this creates an opportunity for the European Commission to learn from the Codex system 
and thereby represents an important input of regulatory ideas when proposals for new 
food regulatory for the EU are made. This argument is supported by the way in which EU 
food law refers to the Codex standards as the preferred international guiding principles 
(Veggeland 2004). 
The European Commission was responsible for negotiating the 1995 WTO SPS 
Agreement on behalf of the European Community (Smith 2003:230-231). This can be 
argued to function as a preparatory exercise and gave the European Commission the 
possibility to draw lessons learned from a previous external process when reforming the 
EU‟s own food safety policy area. By having established an internationally accepted food 
safety regulatory regime, ideas already in use in the WTO could be expected to be easier 
to implement on a European level. The precautionary principle and risk assessment were 
incorporated into the SPS Agreement, and subsequently ratified by the EU Member State 
Governments represented in the Council (WTO 1995: Art. 3.3, 5, 5.7). Consequently, 
when creating a new regulatory framework on the EU level these ideas were already 
familiar for the Member States that were to accept the European Commission‟s 
proposals. This makes it pertinent to argue that a process of EU imitation of the ideas in 
the institutional environment have taken place. 
External Pressure – The Case of the Beef Hormones 
With the SPS Agreement and the creation of semi-binding food standards adopted by the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission a WTO level food safety regulatory regime had been 
established. These institutions represent a framework with which the EU institutional 
arrangement for food safety regulations has to comply. One of the WTO‟s most basic 
functions is the role as a forum for negotiations directed towards the liberalisation of 
trade and the establishment of stable, predictable and non-discriminatory trade rules 
(Veggeland 2008:2). When WTO Member States fail to agree whether or not a Member 
has complied with the SPS Agreement the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure is 
activated. Facing what they believe are violations of agreements, any Member State can 
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demand consultations between the parties and that a panel is established to judicially 
review the case. It is also possible to appeal the panel‟s decision to the Appellate Body. 
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body21 makes the final decision and approves the report 
made by the judging panels (Ibid. 3). 
Especially important for food safety crisis management is the European Community‟s 
failed attempt to prove in the Livestock Hormone Case that its decision to ban hormone 
fed meat was based on scientific evidence and risk assessment procedures (WTO 
1998b:3(i); 1999:3(i),(ii)). The dispute can be traced back into the 1970s when European 
consumers became increasingly concerned over the use of growth-promoting hormones 
in livestock. Under the GATT regime the European Communities decided to ban the use 
of six growth hormones, including a ban on the import of meat and meat products treated 
by them (WTO website3; website6). The United States and Canada made several failed 
attempts to get them invalidated, which led to the 1989 introduction of retaliatory 
measures in the form of duties on a list of products imported from the European 
Communities. Under the WTO Dispute Settlement System one Member alone cannot 
block the establishment of a panel and in 1996 the United States and Canada‟s panels 
were established (WTO website6). A main conclusion of the reports issued by the panel 
looking into the EU ban on hormone fed beef was that the EU hormone studies did not 
comply with the risk assessment requirement in the SPS Agreement and could not 
scientifically support a ban on hormone-treated meat (WTO website 6; 1998b:3(i)). This 
was later confirmed by the Appellate Body, which reached the conclusion that risk 
assessment had not been fully undertaken. Soon after the panel report had been adopted it 
became clear that the European Community would not be able to comply by the deadline 
(Skogstad 2001:495; Veggeland 2002:27). This led the United States to raise its tariffs on 
products from the European Communities by 100 per cent, valued at US$ 116 million per 
year, and Canada to suspend concessions with a value of CDN$ 11.3 million per year 
(WTO website3). 
                                              
21 The WTO Dispute Settlement Body consists of representatives from all WTO Member State Governments.  After 1995 it 
has become extremely difficult to reject a report from the courts since this demands consensus. As long as one Member 
State wishes to approve the report it is accepted (Veggeland 2008:3). 
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As a result of the WTO „judgement‟ the EU introduced risk-assessment studies and 
established science-based measures as a strong overriding principle for food safety. This 
makes external pressure through the WTO SPS Agreement and the dispute settlement 
procedure important for understanding the EU food safety framework. In the Livestock 
Hormones Case, risk assessment was put on the top of the agenda. Even though the EU 
was not able to comply immediately, overwhelming pressure forced it to fulfil the 
requirements. 
6.3 Conclusion: Frame Setting Ideas by Imitation and 
Exogenous Pressure 
This chapter adds a second analytical level to the thesis, taking the effect of ideas 
originating in the institutional environment into consideration. The framework of ideas 
and rhetoric developed by the WTO SPS Agreement and in the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission have been important in framing EU food safety crisis management 
integration. 
Both imitation and external pressure can be argued to have aided the spread of ideas. The 
European Commission‟s parallel roles, first as an external representative of the European 
Community in the Codex Alimentarius Commission and by negotiating the WTO SPS 
Agreement, and secondly, internally by taking initiatives on food safety crisis 
management, has led to imitation by the EU of its institutional environment. The binding 
WTO SPS Agreement has made external pressure important for the EU integration of 
food safety crisis management. This was especially the case in the beef hormone dispute 
between the European Community on one side and the USA and Canada on the other, 
imposing risk assessment and science based measures as guiding principles for all EU 
food legislation. 
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7. Putting the Pieces Together 
The objective of this thesis has been to shed light on the European integration process of 
crisis management in the food safety area. In particular, it has focused on three main 
forces of integration: the EU Member States; the EU level institutions; and ideas 
originating in the institutional environment. This has created a two tier analysis: on the 
first level the focus is on the effects of actions and decision making and the second level 
focuses on the effects of ideas. The final chapter of this thesis starts by presenting the 
main observations and conclusion that can be drawn from this study. Second, it reflects 
on limits of the analyses and the findings‟ research relevance in a wider European crisis 
management context. 
7.1 Main Observations and Conclusions 
The main observations in this thesis can be presented in three main parts, following the 
hypotheses outlined in section 1.1. The hypotheses are derived from distinct theoretical 
approaches to European integration and organisational studies: Intergovernmentalism, 
Historical Institutionalism and an Environment-Based Perspective. 
In the first hypothesis (Hypothesis A, section 1.1) the idea that the Member States have 
driven forward the integration process of crisis management in the food safety area can 
be argued to be only partially correct. The Member States held a rather low-key position 
in the integration of food safety crisis management. This is demonstrated by the way in 
which they submitted only limited comments to the crisis management proposals in the 
hearing responses on the White Paper on Food Safety. By carrying out cost-benefit 
analyses, where it is pertinent to expect that both distribution of gains and efficiency were 
important, the Member States approved the European Commission‟s proposals. A 
plausible explanation for the acceptance of enhanced EU crisis management capacities 
can be that they were accompanied by new control mechanisms and emergency brakes 
for the Member States. This gave the Member States the opportunity to keep a „hand on 
the wheel‟ while moving crisis management decision making and response capacity 
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towards the EU level. When looking into earlier food emergencies it is evident that 
despite heavy protests from important Member States towards EU crisis management 
initiatives they were not successful in changing or stopping them. This shows that there is 
a capacity in the system to override the Member States and that the 2002 Regulation 
strengthens this capacity. Also, this could indicate that the integration of food safety 
crisis management has gone further than key Member States wished. 
The second hypothesis (Hypothesis B, section 1.1), expecting that the integration of crisis 
management on the food safety area has been driven forward by the EU level institutions, 
has offered an enhanced explanatory scope as to who the important actors are when 
compared to Hypothesis A. The European Parliament and the European Commission 
acted as supranational leaders arguing in favour of new EU level crisis planning and 
response capacities. This was done by giving food crises the European adjective 
consequently redefining the polity responsible for crisis management and advocating 
regulatory reform initiatives moving the policy area towards the EU level direction. This 
happened despite heavy protests from important Member States against common EU 
crisis response measures. Within the research time frame a tendency of path dependency 
can be argued to be present, with the initial response to the BSE Crisis establishing 
organisational principles important for working out the 2002 Regulation. However, the 
extensive focus on establishing the single market overshadowing food safety crisis 
management was an important prerequisite for the altering consequences of the food 
crises in the 1990s. Both the 1996 BSE Crisis and the 1999 Dioxin Chicken Crisis 
directed enormous attention towards the failures of European food safety crisis 
management and created windows of opportunities for the EU institutions to promote 
integrative crisis management measures. 
The third hypothesis (Hypothesis C, section 1.1), expecting that the integration of crisis 
management on the food safety area has been driven forward by ideas originating in the 
institutional environment, clarifies important prerequisites for the EU policy initiatives 
taken. The WTO SPS Agreement and the Codex Alimentarius Commission have been 
important in framing the EU integration of food safety crisis management. Organisational 
ideas like the precautionary principle and risk analysis have spread by both imitation and 
external pressure. The European Commission‟s two roles, first as an external 
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representative of the European Community and second, internally by taking initiatives on 
food safety crisis management, has led to EU imitation of its institutional environment. 
By signing the binding WTO SPS Agreement, external pressure has been important as 
the Dispute Settlement Body has imposed organisational principles relevant for EU level 
crisis management. This was especially the case in the beef hormone dispute between the 
European Community on one side and the USA and Canada on the other which made risk 
assessment and science-based measures guiding principles for all EU food legislation. 
As argued in the introduction, the scope of these analyses has not been to strengthen one 
theoretical perspective in relations to the others, but rather to try to create an explanatory 
framework to explain the variance in the data. To get a good understanding of the 
integration process in focus I argue that a holistic approach to institutional change needs 
to be sought. 
It has been necessary to employ a broad understanding of what processes are relevant for 
this study. The formal decision making process is fundamental for the analyses, but also 
relations between the relevant institutions and informal adaptations need to be included. 
This is shown in how the Member States have formally accepted enhanced EU level food 
safety crisis management capacities, while at the same time the crisis management 
framework has been scrutinised by the EU level institutions themselves and adapted to 
ideas in the institutional environment. 
To employ a broad understanding of what actors are relevant has also been necessary. As 
shown, the Member States are the central actors approving decisions. Thus they still play 
an important role in food safety crisis management decision making as they retain 
„emergency brakes‟ and control mechanisms. However, as many of the important policy 
initiatives leading up to the 2002 Regulation were taken by EU level institutions, a strict 
Member State oriented perspective alone is not sufficient. The EU level institutions may 
not alter their mandate freely, but as shown in chapter five they are influential in adapting 
them and in doing so they enjoy a large degree of freedom. The strengthening of the EU 
level capacities on a policy area advocated by Member States to be of national 
importance, shows that a strict rational approach falls short. Here the Institutional 
Perspective; focusing on the initiatives taken by the EU level institutions, and the 
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Environment-Based Perspective; focusing on the effect of ideas originating in the 
institutional environment, offer important supplementary explanations. 
Summary of Key Points and Future Development 
To sum up I conclude with remarks on key concepts of this analysis. The findings point 
towards the European Commission and the European Parliament as the main actors 
driving food safety crisis management towards the EU level. The Member States have 
not been overridden in the integration process in focus, and retain important control 
mechanisms and „emergency brakes‟ in crisis situations. However, looking into earlier 
food emergencies it is evident that despite heavy protests from important Member States 
towards EU crisis management initiatives they were not successful in changing or 
stopping them. With the 2002 Regulation the EU-level capacity to override Member 
States has been strengthened further. This could indicate that the integration of food 
safety crisis management has moved beyond the wish of important Member States, 
supporting the argument that it is the EU-level institutions that have been steering the 
process. In addition, the EU-level institutions‟ initiatives have been framed by ideas 
originating in the institutional environment which coincided with their integrative focus. 
So what will the future bring? Because important exogenous variables for the 
organisation of this policy area change constantly it is hard to predict the future. 
However, as the food policy area is far from static in its nature and since new threats 
towards the safety of European food most likely will arise, I expect the organisation of 
food safety crisis management to continue to evolve. It is highly likely that it will remain 
on the top of the European agenda into the next decade as the safety of food is one of the 
most fundamental challenges in an increasingly globalised world. 
7.2 Relevance and Limits to the Study 
What makes these observations important and relevant? First of all they shed light on the 
aftermath of one of the biggest crises in the history of the EU, the BSE Crisis. As there 
are numerous studies focusing on the food safety area (See Vos 2000; Millstone and 
Zwanenberg 2002; Ugland and Veggeland 2006), the forces steering food safety crisis 
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management integration has received less attention. Second, a direct consequence of the 
multilevel nature of governance in the EU is the division between supranational and 
national levels in its protection space (Rhinard et al. 2006:523). In attempting to better 
understand why crisis management has been integrated, the various links that connect 
these two levels are worth further investigation as shown in this thesis. Third, this study 
contributes to the debate on EU integration in policy areas advocated to be of high 
national importance. As the findings presented above only partially support the 
introductory argument stating that Member States would oppose EU integration of crisis 
management measures, it is clear that a pure intergovernmental approach is insufficient 
when creating an explanatory model for cases of this kind. Fourth, according to Rhinard, 
Ekengren and Boin (Ibid.) research attention should be directed towards the actors 
steering cooperation as well as other factors strengthening the link between the 
supranational and national levels on crisis management. This is in line with the research 
approach for this study, putting it at the forefront of contemporary crisis management 
research. 
The scope of this study is restricted by the limited time and resources available. Several 
of these limitations could be scoped by future research. First, the data suggest that 
valuable information could be found by opening up the category of the „Member States‟. 
A better understanding of the processes that has caused integration of food safety crisis 
management could be gained by investigating the process within the Council and the 
individual Member States. Second, divide the European Parliament and the European 
Commission into their diverse entities could increase our understanding of these 
institutions as they were important in taking policy initiatives. A closer investigation of 
the role of the different Committees of the European Parliament and the Directorate 
Generals in the European Commission could be particularly valuable, as food safety 
crisis management involves elements of a range of different policy areas. Also, to 
investigate the policy development on both the national level and EU level, a deliberative 
perspective could be applied putting the discussion in the spotlight, and introducing a 
more individual oriented approach to the process in focus. Third, as food crises are given 
the European adjective consequently redefining the polity responsible for crisis 
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management, the implication for the Member States and their role in protecting citizens 
should be further investigated. 
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